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assume that risk changes depend on banks' ex ante regulatory capital position. Second, we 
consider the impact of an increase in each component of regulatory capital on banks’ risk 
changes. We find that, for highly capitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks, an increase 
in equity positively affects risk; but an increase in subordinated debt has the opposite effect 
namely for undercapitalized banks. Moderately undercapitalized banks tend to invest in less 
risky assets when their equity ratio increases but not when they improve their capital position 
by extending hybrid capital. Hybrid capital and equity have the same impact for banks with 
low capital buffers. On the whole, our conclusions support the need to implement more 
explicit thresholds to classify European banks according to their capital ratios but also to 
clearly distinguish pure equity from hybrid and subordinated instruments.  
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1. Introduction 
 Bank capital regulation throughout the world is expected to play a major role to ensure 
financial stability. Capital ratios have exhibited an upward trend since the beginning of the 
1990s and banks have been holding higher capital levels than imposed by the Basel I 
requirements implemented in 1993. The more recent regulatory frameworks known as Basel 
II, implemented in Europe in 2008, and Basel III which will be progressively enforced by 
20191, are based on 3 pillars in which capital adequacy rules have been further tightened. The 
global financial crisis that started in 2007 challenges the effectiveness of these mandatory 
capital requirements. It has lead banking regulators to reshape the entire prudential regulatory 
framework. Under Basel III, banks have to comply with higher capital requirements based on 
a narrower definition of regulatory capital restricted to common equity also called core Tier 1 
capital. The aim is to emphasize both the quantity and the quality of capital that banks hold. 
Ordinary (common) shares and retained earnings are also becoming the predominant form of 
Tier 1 capital and hybrid capital instruments qualifying for prudential purposes will be 
progressively restricted.  
The theoretical literature on the impact of capital requirements on banks' risk-taking 
behavior has revealed mixed results.  Furlong and Keeley 1989, Keeley and Furlong 1990 and 
Jeitschko and Jeung 2005 find that capital requirements can reduce the total volume of risky 
assets and thereby contribute to the stability of the banking system. However, capital 
regulation is likely to encourage banks to select riskier assets to offset its negative effect on 
leverage and on profitability (see Koehn and Santomero 1980, Kim and Santomero 1988, 
Rochet 1992, Blum 1999) or introduce indirect incentive effects affecting the effort to screen 
and monitor projects and lending behavior (see Gennote and Pyle 1991, Boot and Greenbaum 
1993, Gianmarino et al. 1993, Besanko and Kanatas 1996). A more stringent capital rule 
could therefore, under some conditions, lead to an increase in banks’ default risk. Calem and 
Rob (1999) also show that because the bank’s portfolio choice depends on its ex ante 
regulatory capital position, it may either decrease or increase its portfolio risk as it moves 
towards compliance with a minimum capital requirement. Several empirical papers have 
analyzed whether banks take higher or lower risk when they are forced to hold more capital 
and also find contradictory results (Shrieves and Dahl 1992, Berger 1995, Jacques and Nigro 
                                                           
1
 For details on Basel II and Basel III, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: “International Convergence 
of Capital Standard, a Revised Framework, Comprehensive Version”, Bank for International Settlements, June 
2006, and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: "Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems", Bank for International Settlement, June 2011. 
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1997, Aggarwal and Jacques 2001, Rime 2001, Heid et al. 2004, Van Roy 2005, Altunbas et 
al. 2007).  
While these papers have investigated the effect of capital regulation on bank risk 
taking, other papers have shown that banks hold buffers of capital indicating that capital 
standards are in general not binding (see Allen and Rai, 1996, Peura and Jokivuolle 2004, 
Barth et al. 2006, Berger and al. 2008). Rather than strictly complying with capital regulation, 
banks are shown to have their own target levels of capital and risk. Depending on the extent 
of their capital buffer, banks will adjust their capital and risk taking to reach their target levels 
(Milne and Whalley 2001, Ayuso et al. 2004, Lindquist 2004, VanHoose 2007, Jokipii and 
Milne 2008, Jokipii and Milne 2011, Stolz and Wedow 2011).   
These two strands of the literature either focus on the risk impact of an increase in 
capital or on the relationship between capital buffers, i.e. the amount of capital held in excess 
of regulatory requirements, and risk. As a whole, the question of how changes in capital 
impact risk-taking incentives for banks that do not initially comply with regulatory capital 
standards remains unresolved. Furthermore, banks can use various instruments such as equity, 
hybrid capital, and subordinated debt to adjust their regulatory capital levels. Whether or not 
changes in different forms of regulatory capital will affect risk-taking incentives differently 
remains an open question. In this paper we jointly consider these two dimensions in an 
empirical setting.  
We first investigate if changes in capital will lead to the same risk-taking behavior for 
banks with different ex ante regulatory capital ratios. Our aim is to specifically focus on 
initially undercapitalized banks but for comprehensiveness we also consider the case of banks 
that hold capital buffers. We therefore differentiate five sub-samples of banks on the basis of 
their capital ratios: (i) highly capitalized when their regulatory risk-based capital ratio (TCR) 
is above 10%; (ii) adequately capitalized when their TCR is between 8 and 10%; (ii) 
undercapitalized when their TCR is strictly below the regulatory threshold of 8%; (iv) 
moderately undercapitalized when they do not meet the total capital requirement but comply 
with the minimum 4% capital requirement on the TIER1 risk-based capital ratio; (v) strongly 
undercapitalized when they comply with neither of these two requirements. In their theoretical 
work, Calem and Rob (1999) show that strongly undercapitalized banks have little to lose in 
the event of insolvency and might take very high risk to meet capital requirements. But they 
also show that highly capitalized banks have incentives to invest in risky assets associated 
with higher expected returns. In between, adequately and moderately undercapitalized banks 
take lower risk. While previous empirical work has already looked at the relationship between 
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capital ratios and risk for banks with different levels of capital ratios and /or capital buffers, 
our aim is to further investigate the case of undercapitalized banks.  
We also examine, within each of our five capitalization categories, if bank risk taking 
is influenced by adjustments in the different components of capital defined by regulators. We 
therefore disaggregate bank capital into equity capital, subordinated debt and hybrid capital, 
i.e. the different components of regulatory capital. Subordinated debt holders are expected to 
be very sensitive to individual bank risk exposure since they are the first to bear any loss in 
excess of the bank’s equity. However, when banks face distress, subordinated debt holders 
might prefer riskier strategies with the expectation that such strategies will allow them to 
recover their investment. Finally, hybrid capital presents the characteristics of both equity and 
debt. Their holders might also behave differently. From this perspective, our approach is 
expected to help supervisors to better monitor banks with different regulatory capital 
structures.  
 We work on a panel of commercial, cooperative & mutual and savings banks from 17 
European countries over the 1992-2006 period. We find that banks’ risk-taking behavior 
depends on the amount of regulatory capital they initially hold and also on the type of capital 
they choose to increase. We find that, for highly capitalized and strongly undercapitalized 
banks, an increase in equity positively affects risk; but an increase in subordinated debt has 
the opposite effect with a stronger impact for undercapitalized banks. Moderately 
undercapitalized banks tend to invest in less risky assets when their equity ratio increases but 
not when they improve their capital position by extending hybrid capital. Hybrid capital and 
equity have the same impact for banks with low capital buffers.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the hypotheses tested and 
presents the econometric framework. Section 3 describes the data and provides some 
preliminary statistics. Section 4 presents our estimation results. Section 5 discusses further 
issues and reports robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical framework 
 2.1 Hypotheses 
 Departing from the ambiguous results provided by existing theoretical and empirical 
papers our aim in this paper is to jointly analyze two dimensions of regulatory capital ratios. 
First, we investigate whether the sign of the relationship between changes in capital and 
changes in risk is conditional on the ex ante regulatory capital positions of banks. Second, we 
examine if the type of capital they use to adjust their capitalization influences their risk-taking 
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behavior. These two dimensions are important because the current regulatory reform (Basel 
III) emphasizes the need not only to increase capital ratios but also to consider a narrower 
definition of regulatory capital, the so-called Core Tier 1 capital in addition to Tier 1 and Tier 
2 capital. The first issue we investigate is whether the relationship between changes in capital 
and changes in risk varies for banks with different ex ante regulatory capital positions. 
Previous papers have considered the impact of capital positions on risk taking but not the 
effect of capital positions on the slope of the relationship between capital changes and risk. 
We therefore investigate if changes in capital will affect risk-taking differently for highly 
capitalized, adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks; the latter we further split into 
moderately undercapitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks. Severely undercapitalized 
banks may take much higher risk to meet capital requirements. Such a behavior might 
increase their probability of default as stressed by the theoretical work of Calem and Rob 
(1999). Because of limited liability, as shown by Rochet (1992), such banks can shift from 
risk aversion to risk-loving behavior. Moderately undercapitalized and adequately capitalized 
banks are expected to adopt a prudent behavior because they can either easily reach the 
standards and avoid regulatory pressure (moderately undercapitalized banks) or become 
inadequately capitalized (adequately capitalized banks). Such a behavior is consistent with the 
findings of both theoretical and empirical papers (Calem and Rob 1999, Shrieves and Dahl 
1992, Jacques and Nigro 1997, Aggarwal and Jacques 2001, Rime 2001). For highly 
capitalized banks that hold large buffers, the expected relationship between changes in capital 
and changes in risk is undetermined. Banks holding large capital buffers might be targeting 
prudent investment strategies but they also might favor riskier investments (secured by 
important buffers), consistent with the U-shaped relationship between capital and risk taking 
found by Calem and Rob (1999). This leads us to 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A change in capital is associated with different risk-taking behavior 
according to the ex ante regulatory capital positions of the bank (highly capitalized, 
adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, moderately undercapitalized or strongly 
undercapitalized). 
 
 Furthermore, we account for the possibility that bank risk taking could depend not 
only on the amount of capital held ex ante but also on the type of capital (equity capital, 
subordinated debt and hybrid capital) used by banks to adjust their capital position. 
Subordinated debt holders are expected to be very sensitive to individual bank risk exposure 
since they are the first to bear losses after shareholders without benefitting from upside risk. 
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Moreover, such investors have incentives to require higher rates of return from banks that 
were providing misleading estimates of their risk exposure (Evanoff and Wall 2002). If 
market discipline is effective, higher rates required by such investors are expected to curb 
bank incentives to take on higher risk (Flannery 2001). When banks are adequately or well 
capitalized, subordinated debt holders prefer less risky assets. However, when banks face 
severe distress, the incentives of subordinated debt holders are aligned with those of 
shareholders (Gorton and Santomero 1990) and they will prefer riskier strategies to increase 
the probability of recovering their funds. Under such circumstances, in the absence of 
regulatory prompt corrective action, troubled banks may ‘gamble for resurrection’ (Calem and 
Rob 1999, Rochet 1992) under the pressure of both shareholders and subordinated debt 
holders.  
On the whole, for severely undercapitalized banks, a change in equity capital is 
expected to positively affect risk but if market participants expect support or forbearance from 
regulators the same result will hold for changes in subordinated debt and hybrid capital which 
would behave as pure equity. At higher levels of capitalization (moderately undercapitalized 
and adequately capitalized banks), an increase in any of the three components of capital will 
moderate risk, but the effect should be stronger for subordinated debt and to a lesser extent for 
hybrid capital which is a mixture of equity and debt. For banks with large capital buffers, as 
argued above, the impact of an increase in capital in general is undetermined because banks 
might be either following riskier or more prudent strategies. However, subordinated debt and, 
to a lesser extent hybrid capital holders are always expected to curb potential higher risk 
taking (exclusively or essentially) benefitting pure equity holders. If banks that accumulate 
large buffers do so because they target higher risk, an increase in subordinated debt or, to a 
lesser extent, in hybrid capital will cause a lower increase in risk than would a change in pure 
equity. Furthermore, strong pressures from subordinated debt holders could possibly lead to a 
decrease in risk. If banks with important buffers adopt a more prudent behavior, an increase in 
any of the three components of regulatory capital will not generate higher risk. This leads us 
to 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The impact of changes in capital on bank risk taking is different 
according to the ex ante regulatory capital position of the bank as well as the type of 
capital (equity, subordinated debt, hybrid capital) used to adjust capital ratios. 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested using a sample of European banks over the period 1992-
2006 by differentiating them according to their initial level of regulatory capital. 
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2.2 Bank risk measures 
We use several measures of both bank asset risk and default risk. To assess bank asset 
risk, we need a measure that captures changes in risk management of the bank in a timely 
manner. We use the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA) based on the Basel 
Accord risk-based capital guidelines2, as proposed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and used 
subsequently by Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (2001), Heid et al. (2004), 
Van Roy (2005) and Jokipii and Milne (2011). This ratio is a rough proxy of risk because it 
merely reflects the allocation of assets among the four weighting categories (0, 20, 50 and 
100%) but not necessarily their actual riskiness. However, using such a measure allows us to 
assess the impact of capital changes on banks’ portfolio reallocations among different 
weighting categories. This measure has often been considered as a reliable ex ante indicator of 
overall risk which is positively related to actual risk (Avery and Berger, 1991). 
We also use the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans (NPL) as in Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992) and Aggarwal and Jacques (2001). Non-performing loans are computed as the 
sum of overdue loans, restructured loans and other non-performing loans. Unlike the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets, NPL is an ex post measure of risk, but it is also considered 
as a good predictor of future performance problems (Berger et al. 1991). NPL is used as a 
complementary risk measure as it might contain information on risk differences between 
banks not caught by RWA. We use the annual changes of our two risk measures (∆RWA and 
∆NPL) because our aim is to assess the implications of changes in bank capital on changes in 
risk taking.   
As an additional risk indicator, we also compute a 3-year rolling window standard 
deviation of the return on assets (SD_ROA). Because we also aim to investigate if a change in 
capital affects bank default risk, we use the logarithm of a 3-year rolling window Z-score 
measure defined as LOG_Z= ,ln((100+MROE) SD_ROE)  where MROE is the 3-year rolling 
window average return on equity and SD_ROE is the 3-year rolling standard deviation of the 
return on equity (all in percentages)3. A higher value of LOG_Z implies a lower probability of 
default. 
                                                           
2
 Throughout our sample period which ranges from 1992 to 2006, the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets 
we use is computed on a homogeneous basis. European banks have introduced the new methods allowed under 
Basel II after this period. 
3
 It could be argued that the Z-score indicator might be inappropriate to investigate the relationship between 
capitalization and bank default risk because it is positively related to the capitalization variable by construction. 
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2.3 Bank capitalization 
We use the annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets (∆CAP=
1t tCAP CAP−− ), following Shrieves and Dahl (1992). Total capital is composed of Tier 1 
capital (equity and reserves) and Tier 2 capital (subordinated debt and hybrid capital)4. To 
focus on changes in each component of capital, we decompose total capital into three 
components, i.e. equity and reserves (EQ)5, subordinated debt (SUB) and hybrid capital 
(HYB)6. This decomposition is important in light of the ongoing debate on what specific type 
of capital has to be considered in the regulatory capital definition. We use the annual changes 
in the ratios of equity to total assets (∆EQ), subordinated debt to total assets (∆SUB) and 
hybrid capital to total assets (∆HYB). 
We further need to measure the level of regulatory capital that banks hold at the 
beginning of each period to determine if this position matters for portfolio risk adjustments 
after a change in capital. For this purpose, we use the value of the regulatory risk-based 
capital ratio (TCR) measured at the end of the previous period7 to classify banks in different 
categories. The risk-based capital ratio is defined as total regulatory capital (TIER 1 and TIER 
2) divided by risk-weighted assets. We follow Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) and Rime (2001) 
to classify banks that exhibit a TCR strictly lower than 8% as undercapitalized banks 
(UNDER). Banks with a TCR ranging from 8 to 10% are regarded as adequately capitalized 
(AD), and banks with a TCR above 10% as highly capitalized (HIGH). The thresholds used to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
However, the correlation between the Z-score measure and the ratio of capital to total assets is very low (0.125) 
in our sample. Its correlation with the annual changes in capital is also insignificant (-0.045). Because the Z-
score variable is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the Z-score as in Laeven and Levine (2009) and 
Houston et al. (2010).  
4
 We define the numerator as the sum of equity capital (equity and reserves), subordinated debt and hybrid 
capital. This definition differs from the one used by regulatory authorities. Our aim is to consider the impact of a 
change in capital in general and is not restricted to regulatory capital per se. We take the amount of total assets as 
the denominator and not the amount of risk-weighted assets. Following the previous literature we consider a 
measure to capture changes in the proportion of capital in the balance sheet. Changes in the regulatory ratio 
could reflect a reallocation of assets among the different risk categories without any change in the actual 
proportion of capital in the balance sheet. However, a change in the capital ratio could also be driven by a 
change in the amount of liabilities such as a decline or increase in deposits.     
5
 For simplicity we use the term equity to refer to the sum of equity and reserves (TIER 1) in the remainder of 
the paper. We therefore equally consider increases in TIER 1 associated to increases in reserves or to equity 
issuance. 
6
 Hybrid capital contains a number of capital instruments combining some characteristics of equity and some 
characteristics of debt. Several elements are qualified as hybrid capital: for example, perpetual preference shares 
carrying a cumulative fixed charge, long-term preferred shares in Canada, titres participatifs and titres 
subordonnés à durée indéterminée in France, Genussscheine in Germany, perpetual debt instruments in the 
United Kingdom and mandatory convertible debt instruments in the United States. 
7
 Our approach is based on discrete time. At time t, we consider the value taken by TCR at time t-1 to assign a 
bank in a given category. This is because we consider capital changes from t-1 to t and risk changes from t-1 to t. 
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classify banks are consistent with the principles of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA)8 
implemented in the US in 1991. We further consider a more detailed breakdown of 
undercapitalized banks than in previous studies. We define as moderately undercapitalized 
(UNDERMODER), banks that do not meet the total capital requirement (TCR < 8) but do 
comply with the narrower capital ratio, i.e. the TIER1 risk-based capital ratio (TIER1 ratio ≥
4%). Banks that do not comply with these two requirements (TCR < 8 and TIER1 ratio < 4%) 
are considered as strongly undercapitalized (UNDERSTRONG). These two categories of 
undercapitalized banks might react differently in adjusting their capital positions. Strongly 
undercapitalized banks need to increase equity capital (TIER1) to comply with capital 
requirements whereas moderately undercapitalized banks can either increase equity capital 
(TIER1) or subordinated debt and hybrid capital (TIER2). Therefore the impact on bank risk 
taking can be different. We consider five dummy variables, one for each capitalization 
category : (i) D_HIGH for highly capitalized banks with 10TCR ≥ ; (ii) D_AD for adequately 
capitalized banks with 8 10TCR≤ < ; (iii) D_UNDER for undercapitalized banks with 
8TCR < ; (iv) D_UNDERMODER for undercapitalized banks with 8TCR <  but TIER1 ratio
≥ 4%; and (v) D_UNDERSTRONG for undercapitalized banks with 8TCR <  and TIER1 ratio 
< 4%. A bank can be classified in different capitalization categories throughout our sample 
period. 
 
2.4. Model specification  
 We now present the empirical specifications used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2: 
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 The PCA involves that banks are classified into one of five categories (well capitalized, adequately capitalized, 
undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized) depending on their total risk-
based capital ratio, Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, and Tier 1 leverage ratio. Because a formal corrective action 
has not been implemented in Europe we simply use the thresholds defined by PCA in the US to classify banks 
according to the level of their regulatory risk-based capital ratio. The minimum capital requirement in Europe is 
8% as in the US, except in Germany where the minimum TCR is equal to 12.5% for newly established banks in 
the first three years of business. We do not have to deal with such regulatory differences as we do not have in our 
final sample German banks that are newly established (see Section 3). The Financial Services Authority in the 
United Kingdom sets additional unpublished capital requirements called “trigger” and “higher target” ratios for 
each bank; the FSA considers that the basic 8% regulatory minimum capital requirement is only appropriate for a 
well-diversified bank. This implies that some banks have to comply with a higher capital ratio. However, as this 
information is not publicly available, we use the same thresholds of 8% and 10% for UK banks. We test the 
robustness of our results by using other thresholds (see Section 5 on robustness checks).  
(1.a) 
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We use specification (1.a) to test Hypothesis 1 that a change in capital is associated 
with different risk-taking behaviors according to the ex ante regulatory capital positions of 
banks. We further use two alternative specifications, (1.b) and (1.c), to examine if the sign of 
the relationship for undercapitalized banks depends on whether they are undercapitalized in 
terms of both the total risk-based capital ratio and the TIER1 risk-based capital ratio (strongly 
undercapitalized, D_UNDERSTRONG) or only in terms of the total risk-based capital ratio 
(moderately undercapitalized, D_UNDERMODER).  
For the dependent variable ( RISK∆ ), we use alternative measures of risk changes 
(annual change in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets ∆RWA, and annual change in 
the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans ∆NPL), the 3-year rolling window standard 
deviation of the return on assets SD_ROA, and a measure of default risk (the 3-year rolling 
window Z-score LOG_Z), as previously defined in Section 2.29. We consider a dynamic 
adjustment by including the one year lagged value of risk variables (in level) as our measures 
of risk could exhibit time dependency (RISKt-1). We expect a negative sign for the coefficient 
of this variable. ∆CAP stands for the annual change in the ratio of total capital to total assets10. 
We first consider in specification (1.a) three categories of banks according to the level of their 
regulatory capital at t-1: highly capitalized (D_HIGH), adequately capitalized (D_AD) and 
undercapitalized (D_UNDER). We remove, however, the dummy variable D_HIGH 
representing highly capitalized banks to avoid singularity. Highly capitalized banks are 
therefore the reference banks upon which we base and compare the coefficient estimates of 
our vector of capitalization variables. To measure the impact of changes in capital on risk 
                                                           
9
 Two of our measures, SD_ROA and LOG_Z, are computed using a 3-year rolling window making first order 
differencing problematic. We do not therefore consider the annual changes for these variables. However, we also 
perform our estimations using the changes in these variables as robustness checks.  
10
 Because the change in risk might only be observable with a lag, for robustness, we also consider the lagged 
value of the change in the capital ratio. 
(1.b) 
(1.c) 
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changes conditional on the level of regulatory capital, we interact ∆CAP with the dummy 
variables D_AD and D_UNDER. 4α  captures the relationship between changes in capital and 
changes in risk for highly capitalized banks. 5α  and 6α  indicate whether adequately and 
undercapitalized banks behave differently than highly capitalized banks ( 5α  and/or 6α  
significant) or not ( 5α  and/or 6α  not significant) respectively. In our investigation, we also 
test the significance of the sum of the coefficients associated to changes in capital and the 
appropriate interaction term ( 4α + 5α  and 4α + 6α ) to focus more closely on the relationship 
between changes in capital and changes in risk for each category of banks. As discussed 
above, we expect either a positive or negative link between capital changes and risk changes 
for highly capitalized banks. The net impact on their default probability will depend on the 
extent of the change in risk relatively to that in capital. Adequately capitalized banks are 
expected to adopt a prudent behavior but the sign of the relationship between changes in 
capital and changes in risk is ambiguous for undercapitalized banks. Banks that are 
moderately undercapitalized at the beginning of the period might reduce risk to avoid 
supervisory as well as market sanctions. On the other hand, strongly undercapitalized banks 
might be tempted to take higher risk. Such behavior might increase their default probability.  
Hypothesis 2, which focuses on the impact on risk of a change in a specific component 
of capital (equity or subordinated debt or hybrid capital), is tested using a desaggregated 
version of specifications (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c) as follows: 
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 We decompose the ratio of total capital to total assets (CAP) into three components:  
equity to total assets (EQ), subordinated debt to total assets (SUB) and hybrid capital to total 
assets (HYB). We consider the annual changes in these components (∆EQ, ∆SUB, ∆HYB) to 
estimate the impact of a change in each component on risk11. Because subordinated debt 
holders are the first to bear losses after shareholders without benefiting from possible higher 
returns, we expect that highly and adequately capitalized banks will take lower risk when 
facing positive changes in the ratio of subordinated debt. However, the interests of 
subordinated debt holders can be aligned with those of shareholders when a bank faces 
distress; in that case, they might support a riskier strategy. Because hybrid capital presents 
both the characteristics of equity and debt, the expected sign is similar to that of subordinated 
debt when banks are poorly capitalized but ambiguous when they are well capitalized.  
 We introduce a set of control variables in all our specifications. We control for bank 
size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE). Large banks are expected to 
better diversify and manage risk. However, large banks could also benefit from safety net and 
too-big-to-fail policies (systemic risk concerns) and increase the riskiness of their assets. The 
growth rate of gross domestic product in each country (GDP) is also introduced in our 
regressions to account for changes in the macroeconomic environment. This variable captures 
                                                           
11
 Note that the sum of the coefficients of ∆EQ, ∆SUB and ∆HYB (β4 + β7 + β10) in specifications (2) equals, for a 
given sample, the coefficient associated with ∆CAP (α4) in specifications (1). It is therefore possible to find the 
results of specifications (1) using specifications (2). However, to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we 
present the results obtained for both specifications (1) and (2).  
(2.b) 
(2.c) 
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the differences in the macroeconomic conditions of the European countries included in our 
sample. While good macroeconomic conditions are expected to reduce banks’ non-performing 
loans, banks might also be taking more risk during the boom period. Therefore, the impact of 
GDP on bank risk changes is ambiguous. In addition, we account for bank efficiency by 
considering the cost-to-income ratio defined as the ratio of total costs to total income before 
provisions and taxes (EFF). Less efficient firms may be tempted to take on higher risk to 
offset the lost returns incurred by a more stringent capital regulation. However, regulators 
may allow more room for leverage for efficient firms with better management (Altunbas et al. 
2007). Finally, dummy variables are included to control for bank type (commercial, 
cooperative & mutual or savings banks) and we consider individual and time fixed effects.  
 
3. Data description and statistical analysis 
Our sample covers banks from 17 European countries from 1992 to 2006, a period 
which covers the Basel I regulatory environment (Cooke ratio). 16 of these countries are 
members of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom) to which we add Switzerland. The first year corresponds to the adoption of the 
Basel I capital requirement accord which came into effect in January 1993. Since risk and 
capital measures are first differenced, 1992 is included in our sample. After 2006 banks have 
to comply with a different method to compute their risk-weighted assets under Basel II 
(McDonough ratio). We consider commercial, mutual & cooperative and savings banks, as 
they all play an important role in the European banking context while having different 
ownership structures. European commercial banks are joint stock companies whereas mutual 
& cooperative banks are owned by their members (customers). Savings banks are generally 
held by stakeholders such as employees and local or regional authorities. These three types of 
banks have to comply with the same capital requirements. Raising capital is traditionally 
considered as more difficult for cooperative & mutual banks. However, the development of a 
wide range of tools and mechanisms has facilitated capital issues on financial markets 
(nonvoting shares, debt instruments and hybrid securities).  
The data are taken from BankScope Fitch IBCA, which provides annual accounting 
data for 6304 commercial, cooperative & mutual and savings European banks during this 
period. We use the World Bank database to collect our macroeconomic data. Because 
BankScope CDs only report data for the last 8 years, we use three BankScope CDs to gather 
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data for our period of study (September 2000, February 2006 and June 2008). We consider 
consolidated data but also use unconsolidated data when consolidated balance sheets are not 
available. All the banks in our sample publish their annual financial statements at the end of 
the calendar year. For accuracy, we only retain banks providing information for at least five 
consecutive years of time series observations as we estimate a dynamic panel data model 
including dependent and explanatory variables in first order differences (annual changes)12. 
Out of the initial 6304 banks, we are left with 1451 commercial, mutual & cooperative and 
savings European banks after data cleaning and imposing data availability for risk-based 
capital ratios (596 commercial banks, 574 mutual & cooperative banks and 281 savings 
banks, see Table A1 in appendix for a breakdown by country13). We end up with a smaller 
sample of 1142 banks when we require information on non-performing loans.  
On average, our sample covers 64% of the total assets reported in Bankscope in 2006 
but is relatively smaller for some countries such as Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Norway and the United Kingdom (see Table A1 in the appendix). We check that the major 
European commercial and savings banks are included in our sample. Our sample is dominated 
by Italian and French banks (respectively 677 and 226). Both countries, along with Germany, 
have the banking systems with the largest number of banks in Europe. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for both our sample of 1451 banks and the largest sample of 6304 banks 
available in BankScope Fitch IBCA. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide some general statistics on our sample as well as a correlation 
matrix for our variables of interest. During our sample period, 1384 banks are highly 
capitalized and 431 banks are adequately capitalized corresponding to respectively a total of 
8851 and 1199 observations (see Tables 1 and A3 in the appendix). A smaller number of 
banks are, at some stage, undercapitalized (101 banks for 178 observations). Among these 
undercapitalized banks, 33 are strongly undercapitalized (i.e. undercapitalized in terms of 
both TCR and TIER 1 risk-based capital ratios) and 57 are moderately undercapitalized (i.e. in 
                                                           
12
 We check if this restriction leads us to exclude banks that are classified as “in bankruptcy” or “in liquidation” 
or “dissolved” or “dissolved for mergers” by BankScope over our period of analysis. Out of the 73 banks that are 
classified as “in bankruptcy” or “in liquidation”, 11 are present in our final sample. Our sample includes 311 
banks that were dissolved out of the 1744 listed by BankScope. 1422 banks are not included in our final sample 
because BankScope does not report information on their total risk-based capital ratio and their risk-weighted 
assets.    
13
 As BankScope provides few information on total capital ratio and risk-weighted assets for German banks, we 
end up with only 27 banks for this country. All these German banks have been established before 1989, so the 
capital requirement required by the regulator over our period of analysis is 8% (and not 12.5% as it holds for 
new established banks). 
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terms of TCR only) corresponding respectively to 44 and 99 observations14. Many commercial 
banks are categorized as undercapitalized compared to cooperative & mutual and savings 
banks (see Table A3 in the appendix). Among undercapitalized banks, around 60 % are 
undercapitalized during 1 year only, 20% during 2 years and 13% during 3 years (see Table 
A2 in the appendix). The same proportions hold for moderately undercapitalized banks 
whereas strongly undercapitalized mostly experience such a situation during only 1 year. A 
closer look at our data shows that among the undercapitalized banks, around 30% remain 
undercapitalized during several consecutive years. 
We further observe that, on average, undercapitalized banks exhibit significantly 
higher risk (NPL, SD_ROA and LOG_Z), lower profitability (ROA and ROE) and a higher 
cost to income ratio (EFF) than highly and adequately capitalized banks (see Tables 1 and 
2)15. Strongly undercapitalized banks are the smallest in terms of total assets. These banks 
also exhibit a relatively higher ratio of equity to total assets than adequately capitalized and 
moderately undercapitalized banks. As the total risk-based capital ratio of strongly 
undercapitalized banks is very low (below 2.50% on average), such banks seem to suffer 
more from their asset quality (high level of risk-weighted assets) than from lower 
capitalization than other banks.  
We note (Table A4) that, on average for European commercial and savings banks, the 
total risk-based capital ratio and the Tier 1 ratio increased from 1992 to 1996, when they 
reached a peak. A similar trend can be observed for cooperative banks but until 1999. The 
implementation of the Basel I accord in 1992 led to an important increase in capital ratios of 
European banks during a transitory period of 4 to 7 years.  
                           Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 here 
4. Estimation results 
 We could potentially encounter endogeneity issues in our regressions; we therefore 
test for the presence of an endogeneity bias in the estimated equations using the Hausman test. 
For specification (1), endogeneity is presumably a problem for the two variables representing 
changes in capital (∆CAP) and the level of efficiency16 (EFF). We use as instruments the 
                                                           
14
 Among the 11 banks listed as “in bankruptcy” or “in liquidation” by BankScope in our sample, only 1 bank 
appears as undercapitalized (and more precisely as strongly undercapitalized); similarly, among the 311 banks 
listed as “dissolved”, 28 are undercapitalized (of which 9 are strongly undercapitalized). 
15
 Mean tests are available from the authors on request.  
16
 Efficiency could be affected by changes in bank risk. If a manager is not very good at assessing and 
monitoring loans, she/he will presumably not reach a high level of operating efficiency. Moreover, a bank which 
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lagged value (in level) of the capital ratio CAPt-1 for ∆CAPt and the lagged value in first 
difference ∆EFFt-1 for EFFt 17. Table 4 shows that we have endogeneity for ∆CAP for the risk 
measures ∆RWA and SD_ROA, whereas we only have endogeneity for EFF with ∆RWA. We 
run the same tests for the different components of capital based on specification (2) and find 
that only the variable measuring changes in equity (∆EQ) is endogenous for the measures of 
risk ∆RWA, SD_ROA and LOG_Z (see Table 5). 
To deal with endogeneity, we can either use 2SLS/3SLS or the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) procedure. The first approach is used in most of the previous studies which 
analyze the effectiveness of capital adequacy regulations and the relationship between an 
increase in bank capital and risk (Shrieves and Dahl 1992; Jacques and Nigro 1997; Aggarwal 
and Jacques 2001; Rime 2001; Altunbas et al. 2007). However, GMM estimators provide 
more efficient estimators in the presence of individual specific heteroscedascticity, as it is the 
case with our data. Moreover, in our framework, 2SLS or 3SLS estimations would not be 
tractable for specification (2) where simultaneous equations need to be estimated for ∆RISK, 
∆EQ, ∆SUB and ∆HYB. We therefore opt for the GMM procedure but we also use a 
simultaneous equations approach for specification (1) as a robustness check (see section 5). 
We use the estimator of Arrelano and Bover (1995) by considering lagged values (in level) of 
the capital ratio CAPt-1 and the equity ratio EQt-1 as instruments for, respectively, the variables 
∆CAPt and ∆EQt, the lagged value in first difference ∆EFFt-1 for the efficiency variable EFFt 
and for the risk variables which are introduced in the model with a one-year lag, we use the 
two-year-lagged values as instruments. For robustness, we also use the first difference lagged 
value of capital and equity as instruments.  
 
                                                     Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
 
Changes in capital and risk for banks with different initial regulatory capital positions 
The estimation results regarding Hypothesis 1 (specifications (1a-c)) are presented in 
Tables 6a-b for our three different measures of asset risk and for our measure of default risk; 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
wants to maximize its long-run performance can reduce the funds devoted to underwriting and monitoring loans. 
Such a behavior will boost efficiency in the short-run but will also increase bank risk. See Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) for more details. 
17
 We first regress, using OLS, each presumably endogenous variable on the instrumental variables and a set of 
exogenous variables not suspected to be endogenous. We then obtain the fitted values (∆CAP_FIT and 
EFF_FIT) and the residuals (∆CAP_RES and EFF_RES) for the two variables suspected to be endogenous that 
we substitute for ∆CAP and EFF in specification (1). We then obtain the results presented in Table 4. An 
endogeneity problem potentially exists if ∆CAP_RES and/or EFF_RES are significantly different from zero. We 
finally run a join test to confirm that we have an endogeneity problem.  
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similarly, the results for specifications (2a-c) are given in Tables 7a-b. As we remove the 
dummy variable D_HIGH, highly capitalized banks are the baseline banks we compare the 
coefficient estimates for the other capitalization categories with. For each category 
(adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, moderately undercapitalized and strongly 
undercapitalized), we test for hypothesis 1 (specifications (1a-c)), the significance of the sum 
of the coefficients associated with changes in capital and the appropriate interaction term. For 
hypothesis 2 (specifications (2a-c)), we also test the significance of the sum of the coefficients 
associated with changes in equity, subordinated debt and hybrid capital and the appropriate 
interaction term.  
The results are consistent with hypothesis 1 that the ex ante regulatory capital positions 
of banks influence their risk-taking behavior differently when they adjust their capital (see 
Tables 6a-b). For highly capitalized banks, we find a positive relationship between changes in 
capital and changes in asset and loan risk (∆RWA, ∆NPL and SD_ROA). Indeed, 4α  is 
significant and positive. These results indicate that highly capitalized banks invest in riskier 
assets when they increase their capital ratio. We also find that such a behavior increases their 
default probability (LOG_Z) indicating that the increase in asset risk more than offsets the 
reduction in default risk attributable to higher capitalization. Regarding adequately capitalized 
banks, we find that they do not behave differently than highly capitalized banks with regards to 
risk-weighted assets and non-performing loans; but the magnitude of the impact of changes in 
capital on changes in risk is generally lower for adequately capitalized banks18. Moreover, 
changes in capital do not significantly impact the standard deviation of the return on assets and 
the default risk of adequately capitalized banks, indicating that these banks adopt a more 
prudent behavior than highly capitalized banks. 
For undercapitalized banks (equation (1.a), we find a significant negative relationship 
between changes in capital and changes in asset risk. Undercapitalized banks seem to adopt a 
prudent behavior when they improve their capital standards to catch up with regulatory 
requirements. Such banks might want to avoid regulatory and/or market sanctions when 
rebuilding their capital ratio. However, when we further separate undercapitalized banks into 
two sub-categories, we note that the reduction in risk only holds for banks that are simply 
undercapitalized in terms of the total risk-based capital ratio, i.e. for moderately 
undercapitalized banks (equation (1.b)). The opposite result holds for institutions that neither 
meet the TCR nor the TIER 1 requirement (equation (1.c)). For such strongly undercapitalized 
                                                           
18
 Wald tests are available on request. 
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banks, we highlight the same behavior as highly capitalized banks as regards to ∆RWA and 
∆NPL, i.e. a positive relationship between changes in capital and changes in the risk-weighted 
assets ratio and in loan risk.  These banks, which exhibit a very low mean value of TCR and 
TIER 1, respectively of 2.48 and 1.59% (see Table 1) might be suffering from the persistence 
of negative outcomes from past investments in poor quality projects. They might also be 
aiming for a higher expected return on equity by reallocating their asset portfolio and by 
selecting riskier and more profitable assets. These institutions seem to be less prudent than 
banks which are simply undercapitalized in terms of TCR and which are close to the minimum 
regulatory requirement since the mean value of TCR for such institutions is equal to 7.10% (see 
Table 1). However, these results have to be considered with caution since, in our sample, the 
number of strongly undercapitalized banks is relatively low (33 banks for a total of 44 
observations). We also find that a change in capital is associated with a higher default risk for 
strongly undercapitalized banks. Therefore, similarly to highly capitalized banks, the increase 
in asset risk for such banks more than offsets the reduction in default risk initially driven by a 
higher capitalization. The net impact is a higher default probability. 
 
                           Insert Tables 6a-b here 
Changes in different components of capital and risk, for banks with different initial regulatory 
capital positions 
 We further decompose bank total capital into equity, subordinated debt and hybrid 
capital and we measure the impact of a change in each component of capital on changes in 
bank risk to test hypothesis 2. Tables 7a-b give the estimation results and show that both the 
type of capital used by a bank and its capital position impacts its risk-taking behavior, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. We find a positive relationship between changes in the equity 
ratio (∆EQ) and changes in the risk-weighted assets ratio (∆RWA) for adequately (1% level) 
and highly capitalized banks (10% level). However, no significant link is found for these two 
categories of banks between changes in equity and the standard deviation of ROA (SD_ROA). 
Our results also show that a change in the equity ratio implies an increase in the probability of 
default (LOG_Z), but only for highly capitalized banks. Conversely, and consistently with our 
previous results, we also find a negative and significant relationship between changes in equity 
and changes in the risk-weighted assets ratio (∆RWA) for undercapitalized banks. We still 
observe the same differences for our two groups of undercapitalized banks. Our results show a 
negative relationship between changes in the equity ratio and changes in the ratio of risk-
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weighted assets to total assets for moderately undercapitalized banks. However, strongly 
undercapitalized banks do not behave differently from highly capitalized banks. Strongly 
undercapitalized banks have little to lose in the event of insolvency and seem to take higher 
risk to meet capital requirements by investing in riskier assets to increase their expected return, 
resulting in a higher standard deviation of ROA (SD_ROA). Similarly to highly capitalized 
banks, this reallocation towards riskier assets increases the default risk of strongly 
undercapitalized banks whereas we do not find a significant impact of a change in the equity 
ratio on default risk for the more prudent moderately undercapitalized banks. 
Our results further highlight a significant positive relationship between a change in the 
ratio of subordinated debt (∆SUB) and a change in the risk-weighted assets ratio (∆RWA) for 
any initial level of bank capitalization, but we also observe a negative link with the standard 
deviation of the return on assets (SD_ROA), with a larger magnitude for undercapitalized banks 
and particularly for strongly undercapitalized banks. On the whole, market discipline exerted 
by subordinated debt holders seems to curb incentives to adopt riskier strategies, especially for 
strongly undercapitalized banks. 
Regarding changes in the ratio of hybrid capital (∆HYB), there is no significant impact 
for highly capitalized banks whereas we find a positive relationship with the risk-weighted 
assets ratio (∆RWA) for adequately (10% level) and undercapitalized banks (1% level).  No 
significant link is found with the standard deviation of ROA (SD_ROA) and default risk 
(LOG_Z). Nevertheless, at low levels of capital buffer, hybrid capital appears to impact bank 
asset reallocation (∆RWA) as pure equity.  
For the control variables, the cost to income ratio (EFF) is positively linked to changes 
in the ratio of non-performing loans and to the standard deviation of the return on assets 
(∆NPL, SD_ROA) (Table 6a). This result suggests that higher expenses are not successful in 
reducing the importance of non-performing loans and asset risk in general. The effect of bank 
size on changes in risk (∆NPL and SD_ROA) is positive suggesting that larger banks might 
hold riskier portfolios which leads to an increase in default risk (Table 6a and 6b). As 
expected, better economic conditions contribute to lower the amount of non-performing loans 
in bank balance sheets. Furthermore, the growth rate of gross domestic product exerts a 
positive and significant effect on changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets 
suggesting that, during booms, banks tend to focus on assets with higher risk coefficients such 
as corporate loans. The coefficients of the dummy variables which differentiate adequately and 
undercapitalized banks are always negative when they are significant; these findings are 
consistent with those of Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Aggarwal and Jacques (2001).  
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 Overall, we find that banks’ risk-taking behavior depends on both the amount of 
regulatory capital they hold and on the type of capital they use to adjust their position. An 
increase in equity is positively associated with an increase in the risk-weighted asset ratio and 
default risk  for highly and adequately capitalized but also for strongly undercapitalized 
banks. But the opposite link is found for moderately undercapitalized banks. Although it 
positively affects the portion of risky assets held by banks (∆RWA), an increase in the ratio of 
subordinated debt reduces risk taking (SD_ROA) regardless of their initial level of 
capitalization. An increase in the ratio of hybrid capital only affects the riskiness of 
adequately and undercapitalized banks. For such banks hybrid capital contributes to increase 
the share of risky assets (∆RWA). This finding is consistent with Basel III's focus on a 
narrower definition of regulatory capital separating hybrid capital from bank core capital.  
 
                           Insert Tables 7a-b here 
 
5. Deeper investigation and robustness checks 
 
 In order to further examine issues related to the influence of capital changes on the 
risk-taking behavior of banks, we carry out a deeper investigation of our sample19. 
 
Isolating the impact of increases and decreases in capital ratios 
 We consider in our regressions both positive and negative capital changes. To go 
deeper in our investigation, we estimate specifications (1a-c) on two separate samples, 
including respectively positive and negative changes in capital20. We are more concerned 
about increases in capital than decreases in capital since we focus on changes in risk when 
banks are forced to improve their capital ratios, namely undercapitalized banks. Around 40% 
of capital changes in our sample are positive changes (increase in capital). The results of the 
estimations on the whole sample (including both increases and decreases in capital) are 
consistent with those of the sample restricted to increases in capital which is the sample 
consistent with our investigation (see Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix).  
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 Some of the estimation results discussed in this section are not presented in the paper but are available from 
the authors on request. 
20
 We are not able to run our specifications (2a-c) when we differentiate positive and negative equity, 
subordinated debt and hybrid capital changes due to lack of sufficient observations. 
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Ownership type 
 We consider in our sample three types of banks with different ownership. Shareholder 
wealth maximization is the traditional objective of commercial banks. However, mutual & 
cooperative banks are owned by their customers and might thus put their interests first 
(O’Hara 1981, Altunbas et al. 2001). Savings banks, on the other hand, are generally held by 
stakeholders such as employees and local or regional authorities and aim to boost savings, 
develop the local economy and support social work (Gardener et al. 1997). These 
characteristics may lead to different business strategies regarding bank lending and 
investment, which can result in differences in profitability and risk (Goddard et al. 2007, 
Iannotta et al. 2007). Moreover, mutual & cooperative and savings banks might experience 
difficulties in raising as much capital as they would like. We therefore run our econometric 
specifications on each type of banks separately. The number of observations for moderately 
and strongly undercapitalized banks does not allow us to run regressions (1.b) and (1.c) 
separately for the three types of banks (commercial, mutual & cooperative and savings banks)  
The main results presented in Section 4 hold for commercial banks. For cooperative & mutual 
banks we find no significant relationship between changes in capital and changes in the risk-
weighted assets ratio (∆RWA), but we find a positive relationship between changes in capital 
and changes in the other measures of risk taking (∆NPL and SD_ROA) for highly and 
adequately capitalized banks. For savings banks, a change in capital positively affects the 
portion of risky assets in total assets (∆RWA) but not the standard deviation of ROA and 
changes in nonperforming loans.  
   
Market discipline 
 It could be argued that banks that are closely monitored by market participants might 
behave differently than institutions heavily reliant on explicitly or implicitly insured deposits 
and that do not issue large amounts of market debt. We therefore run our regressions on two 
sub-samples. The first sub-sample includes banks with a ratio of deposits to total assets below 
the sample median (54.95%). The second sub-sample is restricted to banks that are strongly 
reliant on deposits i.e. institutions with a ratio of deposits to total assets above the median.  
Highly and adequately capitalized banks that are relatively more reliant on market debt do not 
behave differently than banks that are more dependent on deposits (see Tables A7a-b and 
A8a-b). We also observe that strongly undercapitalized banks adopt riskier behavior even 
when they are more reliant on market debt. But moderately undercapitalized banks behave 
differently when their liability structure is different. Our results show a negative relationship 
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between changes in capital and changes in risk for moderately undercapitalized banks that are 
relatively more reliant on market debt. Conversely, we find that moderately undercapitalized 
banks that are more deposit-oriented do not behave differently than highly capitalized banks. 
For such banks that are presumed to be less closely monitored by uninsured market debt 
holders, our findings highlight that an increase in capital positively affects risk, similarly to 
strongly undercapitalized banks. Market discipline is therefore only effective to temper risk-
taking behavior, following changes in capital, for moderately undercapitalized banks, but not 
for strongly undercapitalized banks or well capitalized and adequately capitalized banks.  
 
Reaction in terms of risk the following year  
 Because a bank’s reaction, in terms of risk taking, to an increase in its capital ratio 
might only be observable with a lag, we also run our regressions by considering the one year 
lagged values in capital changes. We find a significant relationship between changes in capital 
and changes in risk only when the dependent variable is the change in non-performing loans 
(∆NPL). No significance is found regarding the link between a change in capital and the other 
measures of risk (∆RWA, SD_ROA) or the link between a change in capital and default risk 
(LOG_Z). Presumably, a contemporaneous increase in risk, driven by an increase in capital, is 
expected to affect the extent of non-performing loans in the longer run which is consistent 
with our results. But our findings also show that such an increase in risk has no impact on the 
future level of a bank’s risk weighted assets, i.e. its asset portfolio allocation, or on its future 
default risk. 
 
Robustness checks 
 Several robustness checks are also performed. First, we estimate specification (1.a) by 
using a simultaneous equations approach for ∆RWA and SD_ROA for which we identified 
endogeneity issues21.We introduce the same set of control variables used in equation (1.a) 
with, in addition, the return on assets (ROA). We use the two stage least square method by 
using instruments to tackle endogeneity issues. Our main results are unaltered (see Tables 
A9a-b in Appendix). Second, we include the annual changes in the risk-weighted assets to 
total assets ∆RWA in specifications where ∆NPL is the dependent variable, as in Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992). Third, we use another threshold to classify highly and adequately capitalized 
banks. We define banks with a TCR ranging from 8 to 12% as adequately capitalized, and 
                                                           
21
 We are not able to run our specifications (1b-c) when we use simultaneous equations due to an insufficient 
number of observations. 
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banks with a TCR above 12% as highly capitalized. Our results also remain unchanged for 
both specifications (1.a-c) and (2.a-c). Furthermore, to be consistent with the other risk 
proxies we use, we run our regressions using the changes in the standard deviation of ROA 
and the Z-score instead of their levels. Again, our findings are unaltered. Finally, to check for 
stability, we also carry out estimations on two sub-periods, 1992-1998 and 1999-2006. Table 
A4 in the appendix shows that, on the whole for commercial, cooperative and savings banks, 
capital ratios exhibit an upward trend until 1998 and remain relatively stable after this period. 
We can assume that after their implementation in January 1993, capital rules were initially 
binding for at least some banks that were catching up with the new standards. Our main 
results are stronger for the second sub-period 1999-2006 in which increases in capital ratios 
are presumably not influenced by the implementation of new regulatory standards. Regarding 
the earlier sub-period 1992-1998, we find a positive relationship between changes in capital 
and changes in nonperforming loans for highly and adequately capitalized banks whereas this 
relationship is negative for undercapitalized banks.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the impact of changes in capital on 
bank risk taking is conditional on the ex ante regulatory capital positions of banks and on the 
type of capital they use to adjust their capital positions. We distinguish different categories of 
banks based on the initial level of their risk-weighted capital ratio (highly capitalized, 
adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, moderately undercapitalized and strongly 
undercapitalized banks). First, we find that banks react differently in terms of risk taking to 
capital changes. Highly capitalized banks increase their risk while undercapitalized banks 
tend to reduce it. However, when we separate undercapitalized banks into two sub-categories, 
we find that only moderately undercapitalized banks lower their risk exposure. Conversely, 
strongly undercapitalized banks take higher risk. Moreover, an increase in capital in highly 
capitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks is associated with higher default risk while 
default risk is not affected for adequately capitalized or moderately undercapitalized banks.  
 Sensitivity analysis shows that strongly undercapitalized banks, but also highly 
capitalized and adequately capitalized banks, do not behave differently when they are heavily 
reliant on market debt, i.e. when they are presumed to be more closely monitored by 
uninsured market debt holders. However, for moderately undercapitalized banks, the negative 
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relationship between changes in capital and changes in risk only holds when they are more 
reliant on market debt.  
 We also disaggregate bank capital into equity, subordinated debt and hybrid capital 
and find that regardless of their degree of capitalization, an increase in the ratio of 
subordinated debt systematically reduces the riskiness of banks even when they are severely 
undercapitalized. At low levels of capital buffer, hybrid capital has the same effect as equity. 
An increase in the ratio of hybrid capital positively affects the risk exposures of banks.   
Our results support the need to implement explicit thresholds to classify European 
banks according to their capital ratios. This would help to clearly specify the conditions for 
supervisory intervention in troubled banks. Our results are also in favor of a clearer distinction 
between hybrid instruments, subordinated debt and pure equity capital in regulatory capital 
standards.  
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Table 1. General descriptive statistics, on average over the 1992-2006 period 
 
 DEP_TA NL_TA ROA ROE Net_margin EFF TCR TIER1 TA 
Full sample of commercial, mutual & cooperative and savings banks available in  BankScope (6304 banks) 
Mean 78.05 56.23 0.53 6.36 3.06 68.11 16.72 15.16 6149.8 
Std. Dev. 17.23 21.83 1.92 10.98 2.11 18.18 8.34 8,93 43171 
Our sample 
All banks (1451 banks) 
Mean 66.57 58.07 0.80 8.57 3.34 67.66 16.28 14.71 18800 
Std. Dev. 15.71 19.01 0.93 9.88 1.57 16.25 7.51 8.09 79104 
Highly capitalized banks (1384 banks) 
Mean 66.83 57.37 0.85 8.73 3.41 67.51 17.45 15.92 17469 
Std. Dev. 15.60 18.95 0.95 8.91 1.59 15.96 7.39 8.01 81527 
Adequately capitalized banks (431 banks) 
Mean 65.16 63.13 0.49 8.34 2.83 67.98 9.14 7.27 29056 
Std. Dev. 16.43 18.37 0.61 12.15 1.35 16.94 0.55 1.51 63220 
Undercapitalized banks (101 banks) 
Mean 63.08 58.92 0.32 1.88 3.07 72.81 5.80 4.77 15902 
Std. Dev. 15.63 20.75 1.23 25.55 1.29 23.46 2.54 2.44 36826 
Moderately undercapitalized banks (57  banks)a 
Mean 61.19 59.95 0.34 5.45 2.85 71.77 7.10 6.18 22065 
Std. Dev. 16.26 21.45 1.02 19.77 1.38 22.17 0.77 1.06 45566 
Strongly undercapitalized banks (33  banks)a 
Mean 63.69 50.59 0.31 -7.77 3.21 73.34 2.48 1.59 12008 
Std. Dev. 14.17 22.02 1.77 37.76 1.13 29.30 2.46 1.45 24552 
 Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentages, except TA which is in millions of Euros): DEP_TA = deposits/total assets; NL_TA = net loans/total assets; 
ROA = return on assets; ROE= return on equity; Net_margin= net interest income/total earning assets; EFF = total costs/total income before provisions and taxes; TCR = total 
capital/ risk-weighted assets; TIER1= tier 1 capital/ risk-weighted assets; TA= total assets (millions of Euros). 
We classify banks in different categories of capitalization: highly capitalized when TCR 10≥ ; adequately capitalized when 8 10TCR≤ < ; undercapitalized when TCR < 8%; 
moderately undercapitalized when TCR<8% and TIER1 4≥ ; strongly undercapitalized when TCR<8% and TIER1<4. 
a
 The sum of banks classified as moderately and strongly undercapitalized (90 banks) does not perfectly match with the number of undercapitalized banks (101 banks) because 
some of these banks do not provide information on TIER1.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of risk measures and capitalization variables, on average over the 1992-2006 period 
 
 RWA ∆RWA NPL ∆NPL SD_ROA LOG_Z CAP ∆CAP EQ SUB HYB 
Highly capitalized banks (1384 banks) 
Mean 66.967 1.082 6.739 -0.366 0.314 4.142 11.318 -0.034 10.428 1.293 0.098 
Std. Dev. 16.761 7.281 6.845 3.072 0.567 1.083 4.573 1.884 4.829 1.379 0.344 
Adequately capitalized banks (431 banks) 
Mean 73.042 2.183 6.228 -0.192 0.218 4.033 7.394 -0.101 5.956 1.567 0.254 
Std. Dev. 17.685 9.218 5.305 2.26 0.326 1.109 2.516 1.172 2.54 1.129 0.532 
Undercapitalized banks (101 banks) 
Mean 72.59 5.308 9.975 0.376 0.424 3.647 7.776 -0.027 6.689 1.342 0.145 
Std. Dev. 18.245 13.328 10.189 4.286 0.661 1.243 4.713 1.831 4.918 1.159 0.363 
Moderately undercapitalized (57  banks) 
Mean 72.124 5.281 9.884 0.397 0.435 3.656 6.841 -0.217 6.117 1.011 0.048 
Std. Dev. 18.663 12.306 10.104 4.892 0.683 1.289 3.805 1.357 3.972 0.89 0.145 
Strongly undercapitalized banks (33  banks) 
Mean 75.476 4.974 10.100 0.566 0.551 3.586 10.914 0.17 9.564 1.571 0.053 
Std. Dev. 17.417 19.794 11.667 3.012 0.791 1.376 6.125 2.502 6.765 1.256 0.127 
 Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentages): RWA = risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆RWA = annual changes of RWA; NPL = non performing 
loans/net loans; ∆NPL = annual changes of NPL; SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of the return on assets; LOG_Z  = logarithm of 3-year rolling Z-score; CAP = 
total capital /total assets =(Equity capital+Subordinated debt+Hybrid capital)/total assets; ∆CAP= annual changes of CAP; EQ=equity capital/Total assets; SUB=subordinated 
debt/total assets; HYB=hybrid capital/total assets. 
We classify banks in different categories of capitalization: highly capitalized when TCR 10≥ ; adequately capitalized when 8 10TCR≤ < ; undercapitalized when TCR < 8%; 
moderately undercapitalized when TCR<8% and TIER1 4≥ ; strongly undercapitalized when TCR<8% and TIER1<4. 
a
 The sum of banks classified as moderately and strongly undercapitalized (90 banks) does not perfectly match with the number of undercapitalized banks (101 banks) because 
some of these banks do not provide information on TIER1.  
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL SD_ROA LOG_Z ∆CAP ∆EQ ∆SUB ∆HYB EFF SIZE GDP 
∆RWA 1           
∆NPL -0.034 1          
SD_ROA -0.068 0.000 1         
LOG_Z 0.059 0.012 -0.418 1        
∆CAP 0.119 0.042 0.002 -0.032 1       
∆EQ 0.104 0.031 0.008 -0.037 0.935 1      
∆SUB 0.053 0.034 -0.004 0.007 0.249 -0.022 1     
∆HYB 0.018 0.007 0.006 -0.004 0.052 -0.010 -0.049 1    
EFF 0.055 -0.004 0.037 -0.052 -0.036 -0.039 0.000 -0.026 1   
SIZE -0.080 -0.022 -0.118 -0.027 0.003 -0.004 0.020 0.014 -0.155 1  
GDP 0.002 -0.053 0.071 -0.138 0.018 0.013 0.007 0.016 -0.159 0.135 1 
∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual changes in the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans; SD_ROA = 3-
year rolling standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year rolling Z-score; ∆CA P= annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; 
∆EQ= annual changes in the ratio of equity capital to total assets; ∆SUB= annual changes in the ratio of subordinated debt  to total assets; ∆HYB= annual changes in 
the ratio of hybrid capital to total assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total asset; GDP= growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. 
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Tableau 4. Hausman test for endogeneity, specification (1)  
 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL SD_ROA LOG_Z 
D_AD  -2.819 0.681 -0.004 -0.376 
 (-4.809)*** (2.339)*** (-0.123) (-4.821)*** 
D_UNDER  -6.689 1.235 0.001 -0.363 
 (-3.696)*** (1.561) (0.015) (-1.462) 
∆CAP_FIT 0.561 -0.245 0.340 -0.174 
 (1.429) (-1.077) (12.675)*** (-2.882)*** 
∆CAP_RES  (γ4) 1.367 -0.014 0.035 -0.005 
 (8.767)*** (-0.174) (3.493)*** (-0.276) 
EFF_FIT 0.136 0.052 0.021 0.025 
 (3.297)*** (3.543)*** (11.562)*** (6.530)*** 
EFF_RES (γ6) 0.028 0.006 0.0002 -0.004 
 
(2.167)** (0.928) (0.330) (-2.360)** 
RWAt-2 -0.068    
 (-6.865)***    
NPLt-2  -0.136   
  (-13.141)***   
SD_ROAt-2   0.338  
   (8.002)***  
LOG_Zt-2    0,347 
    (17.326)*** 
SIZE 0.261 -0.114 -0.033 0.115 
 (3.147)*** (-2.366)** (-5.895)*** (10.214)*** 
GDP -0.265 0.121 0.078 -0,046 
 (-1.829)* (1.627) (8.473)*** (-2.548)** 
D_SAV -6.335 -1.912 -0.928 -0.553 
 (-1.944)* (-1.917)* (-6.886)*** (-2.009)** 
D_COOP -5.623 -1.457 -1.028 -0.330 
 (-1.724)* -1.470 (-7.644)*** (-1.201) 
F-test :      γ4 = γ6  = 0          (40.117)*** (0.070) (6.101)*** (2.792)* 
R2 0.065 0.102 0.184 0.189 
Observations 2557 1665 2195 2169 
 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual 
changes in the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans; SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return 
on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year rolling Z-score; D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% 
in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the 
previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆CAP_FIT=Fitted values of changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets 
obtained when we regress ∆CAP on the instrumental variables and a set of exogenous variables; 
∆CAP_RES=Resid obtained when we regress ∆CAP on the instrumental variables and a set of exogenous 
variables; EFF_FIT=Fitted values of the ratio of cost to income obtained when we regress EFF on instrumental 
variables and a set of exogenous variables; EFF_RES =Resid obtained when we regress EFF on instrumental 
variables and a set of exogenous variables; RWAt-2 =Two years lagged values of the ratio of risk weighted assets 
to total assets; NPLt-2= Two years lagged values of the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans; SD_ROAt-2 = 
Two years lagged values of standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Zt-2= Two years lagged values Z-score; 
SIZE = logarithm of total assets; GDP= growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = 
dummies for mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Tableau 5. Hausman test for endogeneity, specification (2) 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL SD_ROA LOG_Z 
D_AD  -0.377 0.445 0.016 -0.188 
 (-0.451) (1.940) (0.815) (-2.051)** 
D_UNDER  -11.312 -0.099 -0.006 0.122 
 (-3.416)*** (-0.110) (-0.083) (0.730) 
∆EQ_CHAP -0.733 -0.310 -0.009 0.015 
 (-0.900) (-1.408) (-0.462) (0.175) 
∆EQ_RES (η4) 0.985 0.028 0.013 -0.089 
 (3.532)*** (0.392) (2.079)** (-3.044)*** 
∆SUB_FIT -3.335 -0.874 0.0006 0.387 
 (-3.335) (-1.354) (0.009) (1.400) 
∆SUB_RES (η6) 0.173 0.241 -0.025 0.049 
 (0.389) (1.755)* (-2.317)** (1.015) 
∆HYB_FIT 6.069 0.683 -0.327 2.700 
 (0.645) (0.268) (-1.413) (2.610)*** 
∆HYB_RES (η8) -1.520 0.070 -0.002 -0.169 
 (-1.045) (0.207) (-0.059) (-1.146) 
EFF_FIT 0.084 0.013 0.002 0.018 
 (1.945)* (0.985) (1.845)* (3.813)*** 
EFF_RES (η10) 0.014 0.001 0.0005 -0.004 
 (0.621) (0.260) (1.024) (-1.838)* 
RWAt-2 -0.067    
 (-3.647)***    
NPLt-2  -0.083   
  (-6.200)***   
SD_ROAt-2   -0.376  
   (-14.773)***  
LOG_Zt-2    -0.306 
    (-11.007)*** 
SIZE 0.003 -0.051 -0.007 0.016 
 (0.032) (-1.393) (-2.273)** (0.219) 
GDP 0.387 -0.133 -0.001 0.028 
 (1.969)** (-2.355)* (-0.377) (1.272) 
D_SAV -0.363 0.038 0.056 -0.198 
 (-0.127) (0.037) (0.721) (-0.574) 
D_COOP -1.048 0.164 0.012 -0.035 
 (-0.366) (0.156) (0.158) (-0.100) 
F-test :    η4 =  η6  = η8  =  η10        (3.598)*** (0.815) (2.735)** (3.576)*** 
R2 0.061 0.118 0.280 0.183 
Observations 773 231 241 679 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual 
changes in the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans;  SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return 
on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year rolling Z-score; D_UNDER = 1 when bank-risk based capital ratio<8% 
in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the 
previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆EQ_FIT=Fitted values of ∆EQ obtained when we regress ∆EQ on the instrumental 
variables and a set of exogenous variables; ∆EQ_RES=Resid obtained when we regress ∆EQ on the instrumental 
variables and a set of exogenous variables; ∆SUB_FIT= Fitted values of ∆SUB obtained when we regress ∆SUB 
on the instrumental variables and a set of exogenous variables; ∆SUB_RES= Resid obtained when we regress 
∆SUB on the instrumental variables and a set of exogenous variables; ∆HYB_FIT= Fitted values of ∆HYB  
obtained when we regress ∆HYB on the instrumental variables and a set of exogenous variables; ∆HYB_RES= 
Resid obtained when we regress ∆HYB on the instrumental variables and a set of exogenous variables; 
EFF_FIT= Fitted values of EFF obtained when we regress EFF on the instrumental variables and a set of 
exogenous variables; EFF_RES= Resid obtained when we regress EFF on the instrumental variables and a set of 
exogenous variables; RWAt-2 =Two years lagged values of the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; NPLt-
2= Two years lagged values of the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans; SD_ROAt-2 = Two years lagged 
values of standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Zt-2= Two years lagged values Z-score; SIZE = logarithm 
of total assets; GDP= growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & 
cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table 6a. Ex ante regulatory capital position of European banks and risk-taking behavior, 
specification (1) (1992-2006) 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL 
       
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
D_AD 
2
( )α  
-3.506 -3.335 -3.027 -0.101 -0.074 -0.030 
 (-5.60)*** (-5.13)*** (-4.75)*** (-0.54) (-0.37) (-0.15) 
D_UNDER 3( )α  -5.549    0.289   
 (-3.96)***   (0.71)   
D_UNDERMODER 3( )α  
 -4.296   -0.036  
  (-2.89)***   (-0.06)  
D_UNDERSTRONG 3( )α  
  -15.348    0.026 
   (-3.39)***   (0.03) 
∆CAP 4( )α   1.206  1.183  1.003  0.523  0.439  0.397 
 (3.63)*** (3.53)*** (3.04)*** (4.52)*** (4.14)*** (3.79)*** 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
-0.128 -0.049  0.124 -0.350 -0.250 -0.239 
 (-0.30) (-0.11) (0.29) (-2.14)** (-1.53) (-1.49) 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-2.640   -0.665   
 (-4.77)***   (-3.45)***   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -2.881   -0.535  
6
( )α  
 (-4.89)***   (-2.59)***  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -0.047   -0.446 
6
( )α  
  (-0.02)   (-1.16) 
RWAt-1 -0.098 -0.110 -0.144    
 (-1.92)* (-1.98)** (-2.64)***    
NPLt-1    -0.213 -0.260 -0.261 
    (-7.25)*** (-8.51)*** (-8.83)*** 
EFF -0.051 -0.039 -0.035  0.103  0.104  0.098 
 (-1.40) (-1.07) (-0.97) (5.48)*** (5.41)*** (5.35)*** 
SIZE -0.760 -0.979 -1.138  0.756  0.652  0.624 
 (-1.12) (-1.47) (-1.72)* (2.86)*** (2.34)** (2.26)** 
GDP  0.277  0.324  0.304 -0.226 -0.161 -0.124 
 (2.05)** (2.30)** (2.18)** (-3.90)*** (-2.54)** (-1.98)** 
D_SAV  2.016  1.927  1.622  0.429  0.668  0.574 
 (0.50) (0.48) (0.41) (0.33) (0.36) (0.31) 
D_COOP -3.192 -0.872  1.542  0.061 -0.382 -0.442 
 (-0.80) (-0.18) (0.31) (0.06) (-0.21) (-0.24) 
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =     
1.077 
(11.83) *** 
 1.134 
(12.61) *** 
1.127 
(12.74) *** 
 0.173 
(2.23) 
0.189 
(2.17) 
 0.158 
(1.55) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
-1.434 
(10.59) ***  
-1.698 
(12.72) *** 
0.956 
( 0.35) 
-0.141 
(0.83) 
-0.095 
( 0.28) 
-0.048 
(0.01) 
J-stat 86.238 81.389 92.728 193.873 219.152 242.135 
Observations 4761 4445 4402 3716 3183 3144 
 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent the t 
statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual changes in the 
ratio of non-performing loans to net loans;  D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; ∆CAP = annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; RWAt-1 = Previous year ratio of risk -
weighted assets to total assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; GDP = growth rate of 
Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table 6b. Ex ante regulatory capital position of European banks and risk-taking behavior, 
specification (1) (1992-2006) 
 SD_ROA LOG_Z 
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
D_AD 
2
( )α  
-0.032 -0.069 -0.064 -0.025  0.015  0.010 
 (-1.44) (-2.67)*** (-2.51)** (-0.55) (0.28) (0.20) 
D_UNDER 
3
( )α  
 0.032   -0.027   
 (0.58)   (-0.22)   
D_UNDERMODER 
3
( )α  
  0.023    0.005  
  (0.31)   (0.03)  
D_UNDERSTRONG 
3
( )α  
   0.072   -0.081 
   (0.65)   (-0.32) 
∆CAP
4
( )α  
 0.157  0.214  0.213 -0.140 -0.174 -0.186 
 (9.27)*** (9.35)*** (9.48)*** (-4.30)*** (-3.49)*** (-3.80)*** 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
-0.167 -0.220 -0.221  0.108  0.152  0.169 
 (-7.71)*** (-7.82)*** (-7.95)*** (2.49)** (2.50)** (2.81)*** 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-0.256    0.101   
 (-9.56)***   (1.64)   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -0.313    0.165  
6
( )α  
 (-9.34)***   (2.15)**  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -0.232    0.006 
6
( )α  
  (-3.95)***   (0.04) 
SD_ROAt-1  0.550  0.508  0.498    
 (19.33)*** (12.81)*** (12.39)***    
LOG_Zt-1     0.661  0.621  0.601 
    (16.76)*** (13.72)*** (13.54)*** 
EFF  0.014  0.013  0.012 -0.007 -0.015 -0.015 
 (7.06)*** (6.34)*** (5.84)*** (-1.57) (-3.38)*** (-3.26)*** 
SIZE  0.288  0.304  0.299 -0.393 -0.448 -0.461 
 (8.40)*** (7.01)*** (6.97)*** (-5.79)*** (-5.06)*** (-5.25)*** 
GDP  0.004  0.011  0.009 -0.001 -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.56) (1.16) (1.07) (-0.05) (-0.43) (-0.62) 
D_SAV -0.103  0.050  0.049  0.185 -0.080 -0.087 
 (-0.76) (0.26) (0.25) (0.64) (-0.20) (-0.22) 
D_COOP  0.080  0.155  0.129 -0.154 -0.178 -0.174 
 (0.80) (0.82) (0.67) (-0.72) (-0.46) (-0.44) 
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =        
-0.010 
(0.61) 
-0.005 
(0.12) 
-0.008 
(0.26) 
-0.031 
(1.26) 
-0.021 
( 0.45) 
-0.016 
(0.26) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
-0.098 
(23.15) *** 
-0.098 
(16.95) *** 
-0.019 
(0.13)  
-0.039 
( 0.53) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.179 
(1.961) 
J-stat 457.863 326.958 354.455 40.297 6.233 37.971 
Observations 4923 3959 3927 4850 3903 3870 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year 
rolling Z-score; D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; ∆CAP= annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; SD_ROAt-1 = previous year 
SD_ROA; ; LOG_Zt-1 = previous year LOG_Z; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; 
GDP= growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and 
savings banks. 
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Table 7a. Impact of changes in equity, subordinated debt and hybrid instrument on European 
banks’ risk changes, specification (2) (1992-2006) 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL 
 (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) 
∆EQ 
4
( )β  
 0.687  0.979  0.962 -0.003  0.067 -0.062 
 (1.11) (1.74)* (1.66)* (-0.02) (0.35) (-0.32) 
∆EQ *D_AD 
5
( )β  
 1.609  1.502  1.450 -0.026  0.026 -0.002 
 (1.94)* (1.82)* (1.72)* (-0.10) (0.09) (-0.01) 
∆EQ*D_UNDER 
6
( )β  
-3.725   -0.211   
 (-4.14)***   (-0.77)   
∆EQ * D_UNDERMODER 
6
( )β  
 -4.999   -0.011  
  (-5.30)***   (-0.03)  
∆EQ * D_UNDERSTRONG 
6
( )β  
   0.503   -0.601 
   (0.28)   (-1.65)* 
     F-test :   
4 5
0ββ + =  2.297 (12.81) *** 
2.481 
(14.43) *** 
 2.413 
(13.24) *** 
-0.030 
(0.02) 
0.094 
( 0.184) 
-0.065 
(0.09) 
                   
4 6
0ββ + =                         -3.037 (22.54) *** 
-4.019 
( 31.23) *** 
 1.466 
(0.73) 
-0.215 
(1.061) 
 0.057 
( 0.04) 
-0.663** 
(4.25) 
∆SUB 
7
( )β  
 0.961  0.968  0.964 -0.069 -0.089 -0.112 
 (3.38)*** (3.46)*** (3.40)*** (-0.60) (-0.82) (-1.02) 
∆SUB *D_AD 
8
( )β  
-0.649 -0.306 -0.209  0.107  0.147  0.134 
 (-0.96) (-0.45) (-0.30) (0.43) (0.63) (0.57) 
∆SUB *D_UNDER 
9
( )β  
 0.346    0.817   
 (0.19)   (1.40)   
∆SUB * D_UNDERMODER 
9
( )β  
  1.083    1.157  
  (0.41)   (1.33)  
∆SUB * D_UNDERSTRONG 
9
( )β  
   1.494    0.853 
   (0.56)   (1.02) 
     F-test :   
7 8
0ββ + =   0.311 (0.25) 
0.662 
(1.18) 
0.754 
( 1.45) 
0.038 
(0.03) 
 0.057 
(0.08) 
 0.02 
(0.01) 
                  
7 9
0ββ + =  1.307 ( 0.56) 
 2.052 
(0.62) 
 2.458 
(0.85) 
0.748 
(1.71) 
1.068 
(1.55) 
0.741 
(0.80) 
∆HYB 
10
( )β  
 0.097  0.293  0.242  0.150  0.149  0.116 
 (0.12) (0.37) (0.30) (0.52) (0.56) (0.43) 
∆HYB *D_AD 
11
( )β  
 3.013  3.068  3.175  0.001  0.058  0.060 
 (1.60) (1.64)* (1.68)* (0.002) (0.10) (0.11) 
∆HYB *D_UNDER 
12
( )β  
 79.046    0.881   
 (3.40)***   (0.28)   
∆HYB * D_UNDERMODER 
12
( )β  
  233.431    21.258  
  (3.82)***   (1.65)*  
∆HYB * D_UNDERSTRONG 
12
( )β  
  NA    2.709 
      (0.26) 
      F-test :   
10 11
0ββ + =  3.111 (3.39) *** 
3.361 
(3.98) ** 
3.417 
(4.01) ** 
0.151 
( 0.09) 
 0.207 
(0.19) 
0.176 
( 0.13) 
                  
10 12
0ββ + =  79.144 (11.62) *** 
233.72 
(14.70) *** 
NA 
NA 
 1.031 
(0.11) 
21.407 
(2.76) * 
2.825 
(0.074) 
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Table 7a (continue). Impact of changes in equity, subordinated debt and hybrid instrument on 
European banks’ risk changes, specification (2) (1992-2006) 
 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL 
 (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) 
RWAt-1 -0.118 -0.098 -0.111    
 (-2.05)** (-1.78)* (-1.96)**    
NPLt-1    -0.066 -0.235 -0.200 
    (-1.23) (-3.92)*** (-3.34)*** 
D_AD  -2.145 -2.060 -2.113  0.151  0.191  0.248 
 (-3.03)*** (-2.96)*** (-2.96)*** (0.65) (0.86) (1.10) 
D_UNDER  -5.19    0.602   
 (-2.76)***   (1.05)   
D_UNDERMODER   -4.296   -0.196  
  (-1.86)*   (-0.26)  
D_UNDERSTRONG    -17.064    2.71 
   (-3.19)***   (2.61)*** 
EFF -0.025 -0.001  0.009 -0.050 -0.049 -0.058 
 (-0.43) (-0.01) (0.14) (-1.56) (-1.59) (-2.00)** 
SIZE -2.193 -1.863 -2.381 -0.017 -0.265 -0.464 
 (-2.21)** (-1.91)* (-2.38)** (-0.04) (-0.68) (-1.19) 
GDP  0.781  0.827  0.893 -0.181 -0.156 -0.084 
 (4.56)*** (4.77)*** (5.06)*** (-2.94)*** (-2.66)*** (-1.42) 
DUM_SAV  0.799  1.192  1.338 -0.443 -0.522 -0.706 
 (0.21) (0.33) (0.36) (-0.31) (-0.40) (-0.54) 
DUM_COOP -0.604 -0.165  2.630 -0.351 -0.928 -0.903 
 (-0.14) (-0.04) (0.60) (-0.22) (-0.62) (-0.55) 
J-stat 52.758 48.794 57.132 83.721 119.274 125.583 
Observations 1532 1428 1414 1187 1070 1060 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual 
changes in the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans; D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital 
ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and 
tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% 
and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_AD=1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  
and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆EQ = annual changes in the ratio of equity capital to total assets; 
∆SUB = annual changes in the ratio of subordinated debt  to total assets; ∆HYB = annual changes in the ratio of 
hybrid capital to total assets; RWAt-1= previous year ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ; NPLt-1 = 
previous year ratio of non-performing loans to net loans; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total 
assets; GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & 
cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table 7b. Impact of changes in equity, subordinated debt and hybrid instrument on European 
banks’ risk changes, specification (2) (1992-2006) 
 SD_ROA LOG_Z 
 (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) 
∆EQ 
4
( )β  
-0.017 -0.019 -0.019 -0.171 -0.193 -0.182 
 (-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.72) (-2.75)*** (-3.13)*** (-2.97)*** 
∆EQ *D_AD 
5
( )β  
 0.016  0.008  0.009  0.113  0.230  0.212 
 (0.53) (0.22) (0.24) (1.44) (2.54)** (2.35)** 
∆EQ*D_UNDER 
6
( )β  
-0.010    0.199   
 (-0.24)   (1.81)*   
∆EQ * D_UNDERMODER 
6
( )β  
 -0.057    0.256  
  (-1.14)   (2.22)**  
∆EQ * D_UNDERSTRONG 
6
( )β  
   0.203    0.880 
   (2.18)**   (0.73) 
     F-test:   
4 5
0ββ + =  -0.001 (0.0003) 
-0.011 
(0.14) 
-0.009 
(0.106) 
-0.057 
(1.169) 
0.036 
( 0.292) 
0.030 
(0.194) 
                   
4 6
0ββ + =                       -0.028 (0.65) 
-0.076 
(3.43)* 
0.184 
(4.35)** 
0.028 
(0.098) 
0.062 
(0.42) 
0.698 
(0.338) 
∆SUB 
7
( )β  
-0.011 -0.023 -0.023  0.022  0.036  0.038 
 (-0.85) (-1.66)* (-1.67)* (0.68) (1.08) (1.13) 
∆SUB *D_AD 
8
( )β  
 0.007  0.024  0.025  0.025  0.030  0.027 
 (0.25) (0.7467) (0.7829) (0.3327) (0.3978) (0.36) 
∆SUB *D_UNDER 
9
( )β  
-0.184   -0.480   
 (-2.05)**   (-1.60)   
∆SUB * D_UNDERMODER 
9
( )β  
  0.026   -0.255  
  (0.16)   (-0.70)  
∆SUB * D_UNDERSTRONG 
9
( )β  
  -0.427   -2.308 
   (-3.18)***   (-1.03) 
     F-test:   
7 8
0ββ + =  -0.003 (0.017) 
0.0005 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.047 
(0.482) 
0.066 
(0.935) 
0.065 
(0.899) 
                  
7 9
0ββ + =  -0.195** (4.201) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.45*** 
(11.423) 
-0.458 
(2.38) 
-0.218 
(0.37) 
-2.27 
(1.034) 
∆HYB 
10
( )β  
-0.024 -0.027273 -0.027326 -0.046388 -0.044496 -0.044 
 (-0.67) (-0.7186) (-0.7249) (-0.5172) (-0.5037) (-0.50) 
∆HYB *D_AD 
11
( )β  
 0.019  0.023699  0.023498 -0.048315 -0.066404 -0.065 
 (0.26) (0.3102) (0.3097) (-0.2703) (-0.3731) (-0.36) 
∆HYB *D_UNDER 
12
( )β  
-0.240   -0.300320   
 (-0.43)   (-0.2189)   
∆HYB * D_UNDERMODER 
12
( )β  
  0.009057   -1.510809  
  (0.0045)   (-0.3218)  
∆HYB * D_UNDERSTRONG 
12
( )β  
   2.279621    6.892 
   (1.2391)   (0.45) 
   F-test:    
10 11
0ββ + =   -0.005 (0.006) 
 -0.0035 
(0.002) 
 -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.094 
(0.381) 
-0.11 
(0.521) 
-0.109 
(0.511) 
                  
10 12
0ββ + =  -0.264 (0.235) 
-0.018 
(0.00) 
2.252 
(1.499) 
-0.346 
(0.064) 
-0.555 
( 0.109) 
6.847 
(0.199) 
 
 
 35
Table 7b (continue). Impact of changes in equity, subordinated debt and hybrid instrument on 
European banks’ risk changes, specification (2) (1992-2006) 
 
 SD_ROA LOGZ 
 (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) 
SD_ROAt-1  0.488  0.412  0.425    
 (13.84)*** (10.642)*** (10.839)***    
LOG_Zt-1     0.565  0.481  0.488 
    (9.29)*** (7.22)*** (7.37)*** 
D_AD  -0.023 -0.032 -0.033 -0.011 -0.015 -0.007 
 (-0.82) (-1.01) (-1.06) (-0.16) (-0.20) (-0.10) 
D_UNDER   0.107    0.085   
 (1.24)   (0.35)   
D_UNDERMODER    0.006   -0.207  
  (0.05)   (-0.65)  
D_UNDERSTRONG    -0.018    0.056 
   (-0.10)   (0.07) 
EFF  0.008  0.014  0.013 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
 (3.21)*** (4.37)*** (4.04)*** (-0.60) (-0.81) (-0.97) 
SIZE  0.024  0.004  0.002 -0.367 -0.396 -0.403 
 (0.50) (0.07) (0.05) (-3.09)*** (-3.19)*** (-3.24)*** 
GDP  0.004  0.005  0.003 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.52) (0.48) (0.35) (-0.46) (-0.24) (-0.11) 
DUM_SAV  0.012 -0.030 -0.032 -0.026 -0.073 -0.072 
 (0.08) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.07) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
DUM_COOP  0.108  0.168  0.132 -0.229 -0.293 -0.290 
 (0.66) (0.95) (0.72) (-0.53) (-0.68) (-0.67) 
J-stat 439.169 420.809 427.591 36.122 46.405 45.188 
Observations 1726 1438 1430 1702 1421 1411 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year 
rolling Z-score; D_UNDER =1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; ∆EQ = annual changes in the ratio of equity capital to total assets; ∆SUB = annual changes in the 
ratio of subordinated debt  to total assets; ∆HYB = annual changes in the ratio of hybrid capital to total assets; 
SD_ROAt-1 = previous year ratio SD_ROA; LOG_Zt-1 = previous year LOGZ; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE 
= logarithm of total assets; GDP= Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies 
for mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Distribution of banks by country and type 
Country Number of 
banks 
% Total 
assetsa 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Mutual & cooperative 
banks 
Austria 9 62.88 5 2 2 
Belgium 26 92 18 5 3 
Denmark 91 36.14 57 34 0 
Finland 10 96.8 8 1 1 
France 226 51.52 130 18 78 
Germany 27 30.71 16 2 9 
Greece 13 91.25 13 0 0 
Ireland 11 47.79 9 2 0 
Italy 677 71.18 139 65 473 
Luxembourg 33 40.63 32 1 0 
Netherlands 30 61.56 29 1 0 
Norway 51 36.73 15 36 0 
Portugal 22 86.48 18 3 1 
Spain 77 91.21 26 46 5 
Sweden 84 74.12 21 63 0 
Switzerland 19 84.15 16 1 2 
United 
Kingdom 
45 31.48 44 1 0 
Total 1451 63.92 596 281 574 
a % Total assets represents total assets of commercial, savings and mutual & cooperative banks we consider in 
our sample divided by total assets of commercial, savings and mutual & cooperative banks of the largest sample 
of banks provided by BankScope Fitch IBCA for the year 2006. 
 
Table A2. Frequency of banks capitalization status, over the 1992-2006 period 
 Highly 
capitalized 
Adequately 
capitalized 
Undercapitalized Moderately 
undercapitalized 
Strongly  
undercapitalized 
1 year 83 155 62 33 26 
2 years 100 97 19 12 5 
3 years 86 52 13 9 2 
4 years 104 46 3 1 0 
5 years 165 25 2 1 0 
6 years 195 35 1 1 0 
7 years 194 7 1 0 0 
8 years 191 4 0 0 0 
9 years 69 8 0 0 0 
10 years 37 2 0 0 0 
11 years 43 0 0 0 0 
12 years 42 0 0 0 0 
13 years 29 0 0 0 0 
14 years 22 0 0 0 0 
15 years 24 0 0 0 0 
Total 1384 431 101 57 33 
We classify banks in different categories of capitalization: highly capitalized when TCR 10≥ ; adequately 
capitalized when 8 10TCR≤ < ; undercapitalized when TCR < 8%; moderately undercapitalized when TCR<8% 
and TIER1 4≥ ; strongly undercapitalized when TCR<8% and TIER1<4. The sum of banks classified as 
moderately and strongly undercapitalized does not perfectly match with the number of undercapitalized banks 
because some of these banks do not provide information on TIER1. TCR = total capital/ risk-weighted assets; 
TIER1= tier 1 capital/ risk-weighted assets. 
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Table A3. Distribution of the sample by year, by type of bank and category of capitalization 
Years Highly capitalized Adequately capitalized Undercapitalized Moderately 
undercapitalized 
Strongly  
undercapitalized 
Total 
observations 
 COM COOP SAV COM COOP SAV COM COOP SAV COM COOP SAV COM COOP SAV 
1992 91 10 23 10 46 2 9 1 1 3 1 1 2 0 0 193 
1993 163 47 58 11 49 3 7 1 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 340 
1994 204 66 69 11 31 3 11 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 395 
1995 230 83 97 12 42 4 8 1 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 477 
1996 242 90 112 10 49 4 8 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 516 
1997 252 83 118 14 47 3 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 524 
1998 251 160 136 15 51 10 9 8 1 4 3 0 2 5 1 641 
1999 267 365 120 20 53 9 13 5 0 10 2 0 2 3 0 852 
2000 245 412 117 24 61 18 7 7 1 6 3 1 0 4 0 892 
2001 228 363 176 18 77 20 10 3 2 8 1 2 1 2 0 897 
2002 232 420 185 21 64 18 7 4 4 4 3 4 2 1 0 955 
2003 243 430 176 26 49 19 4 3 4 2 1 4 1 2 0 954 
2004 225 435 158 17 48 26 4 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 916 
2005 218 337 173 17 52 17 4 3 5 2 1 4 1 0 0 826 
2006 198 387 156 22 56 20 7 1 3 5 1 3 1 0 0 850 
Total 
number of 
observations 
3289 3688 1874 248 775 176 115 39 24 62 17 20 24 18 2 10228 
We classify banks in different categories of capitalization: highly capitalized when TCR 10≥ ; adequately capitalized when 8 10TCR≤ < ; undercapitalized when TCR < 8%; 
moderately undercapitalized when TCR<8% and TIER1 4≥ ; strongly undercapitalized when TCR<8% and TIER1<4. The sum of banks classified as moderately and strongly 
undercapitalized does not perfectly match with the number of undercapitalized banks because some of these banks do not provide information on TIER1.  
COM = commercial banks; COOP = cooperative & mutual banks; SAV = savings banks. TCR = total capital/ risk-weighted assets; TIER1= tier 1 capital/ risk-weighted assets. 
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Table A4. Evolution of European banks capitalization over the 1992-2006 period 
 
Years 
Commercial banks Cooperative & mutual banks Savings banks 
TCR TIER1 CAP TCR TIER1 CAP TCR TIER1 CAP 
1992 12.83 8.22 8.01 10.72 9.79 7.13 14.16 9.31 6.65 
1993 14.03 9.68 8.85 13.98 12.25 7.93 15.16 9.76 8.28 
1994 15.05 10.78 9.18 14.65 11.42 8.53 15.82 11.07 8.68 
1995 15.32 11.28 9.26 15.36 10.86 8.92 16.58 11.63 9.20 
1996 15.65 11.55 9.26 15.91 10.71 9.07 17.20 12.74 9.54 
1997 15.28 11.44 9.38 15.72 11.41 9.35 16.32 12.99 9.70 
1998 15.25 12.17 9.77 17.73 18.33 11.28 15.48 13.79 9.94 
1999 14.59 12.01 9.83 20.72 21.09 12.85 14.91 13.84 10.34 
2000 14.36 11.60 10.15 20.41 20.74 13.27 14.02 12.95 10.22 
2001 13.86 11.15 10.01 20.11 19.77 12.34 16.03 12.39 11.42 
2002 14.21 11.10 10.14 20.11 19.31 12.46 15.81 14.15 11.60 
2003 14.67 12.09 10.46 18.81 17.91 12.27 15.58 13.76 11.73 
2004 14.02 11.46 10.16 18.04 17.32 12.12 15.32 14.34 11.78 
2005 13.96 11.29 10.07 16.66 15.96 11.64 15.11 13.65 12.39 
2006 13.22 10.51 9.85 17.08 16.33 11.83 14.99 12.92 12.35 
Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentages): TCR = total capital/ risk-weighted assets; 
TIER1= tier 1 capital/ risk-weighted assets; CAP = total capital/total assets. 
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Table A5a. Increase in capital (∆CAP>0) and risk-taking behavior (1992-2006) 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL 
       
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP 4( )α  -0.238 -0.104  0.192  0.559  0.496  0.541 
 (-0.427) (-0.191) (0.360) (1.742)* (1.605) (1.703)* 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
 1.876  1.739  1.595 -0.342 -0.331 -0.402 
 (2.725)*** (2.535)** (2.308)** (-0.899) (-0.951) (-1.117) 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-1.430 
(-1.905)*   
-0.677 
(-1.871)*   
       
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -1.848   -0.592  
6
( )α  
 (-2.314)**   (-1.621)  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -0.887   -0.862 
6
( )α  
  (-0.324)   (-1.126) 
RWAt-1 -0.206 -0.223 -0.251    
 (-2.988)*** (-2.886)*** (-3.371)***    
NPLt-1    -0.211 -0.259 -0.215 
    
(-
5.328)*** 
(-
5.590)*** (-4.582)*** 
D_AD  -4.909 -4.730 -4.568  0.216  0.334  0.428 
 (-5.421)*** (-5.040)*** (-4.947)*** (0.660) (0.957) (1.195) 
D_UNDER  -3.413    0.767   
 (-1.923)*   (1.279)   
D_UNDERMODER   -2.295    0.445  
  (-1.183)   (0.599)  
D_UNDERSTRONG    -6.962    0.964 
   (-0.857)   (0.572) 
EFF -0.051 -0.045 -0.066  0.098  0.121  0.145 
 (-0.948) (-0.785) (-1.102) (3.469)*** (3.647)*** (3.800)*** 
SIZE -0.850 -0.534 -0.608 -0.020 -0.110  0.237 
 (-0.991) (-0.630) (-0.721) (-0.052) (-0.275) (0.568) 
GDP  0.351  0.395  0.303 -0.132 -0.056 -0.084 
 (1.876)* (2.045)** (1.578) (-1.537) (-0.594) (-0.851) 
D_SAV -11.510 -11.297 -10.102  2.368   
 (-1.094) (-1.071) (-0.967) (0.679)   
D_COOP -1.066 -0.842  1.754  0.888   
 (-0.189) (-0.148) (0.283) (0.689)   
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =     
1.637 
(9.694)*** 
1.635 
(8.996)*** 
1.787 
(10.613)*** 
 0.217 
(1.354) 
0.165 
( 0.596) 
0.138 
(0.391) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
-1.669 
(10.206)*** 
-1.953 
(10.952)*** 
-0.695 
(0.065)  
-0.118 
( 0.360) 
-0.096 
( 0.201) 
-0.320 
(0.202) 
J-stat 67.383 67.162 73.540 97.214 73.193 68.893 
Observations 2058 1894 1858 1522 1266 1233 
 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent the t 
statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual changes in the ratio 
of non-performing loans to net loans;  D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆CAP 
= annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; RWAt-1 = Previous year ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; 
D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table A5b. Increase in capital (∆CAP>0) and risk-taking behavior (1992-2006) 
 SD_ROA LOG_Z 
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP
4
( )α  
 0.0001  0.131  0.096 -0.092 -0.093 -0.106 
 (0.006) (4.101)*** (3.277)*** (-1.425) (-1.300) (-1.524) 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
 0.006 -0.101 -0.073  0.002  0.0006  0.013 
 (0.276) (-2.972)*** (-2.319)** (0.030) (0,008) (0.162) 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-0.122    0.063   
 (-5.114)***   (0.707)   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -0.253    0.115  
6
( )α  
 (-6.983)***   (1.146)  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -0.030   -0.021 
6
( )α  
  (-0.510)   (-0.124) 
SD_ROAt-1  0.524  0.412 -0.619    
 (17.779)*** (11.074)*** (-16.910)***    
LOG_Zt-1     0.665  0.628  0.598 
    (13.355)*** (11.077)*** (10.828)*** 
D_AD  -0.010  0.030  0.021  0.012  0.039  0.022 
 (-0.420) (0.926) (0.710) (0.171) (0.476) (0.271) 
D_UNDER   0,173    0.025   
 (3.301)***   (0.151)   
D_UNDERMODER    0.254    0.083  
  (3.319)***   (0.399)  
D_UNDERSTRONG     0.041   -0.215 
   (0.340)   (-0.633) 
EFF  0.002  0.008  0.007  0.001 -0.009 -0.008 
 (1.341) (3.217)*** (2.927)*** (0.188) (-1.488) (-1.361) 
SIZE  0.009  0.133  0.078 -0.288 -0.267 -0.290 
 (0.266) (2.598)*** (1.617) (-2.623)*** (-2.190)** (-2.392)** 
GDP -0.001 -0.007 -0.008  0.0008 -0.0009 -0.004 
 (-0.238) (-0.780) (-0.996) (0.039) (-0.041) (-0.180) 
D_SAV -0.356  0.071  0.028  0.348 -0.384 -0.399 
 (-2.916)*** (0.351) (0.147) (0.968) (-0.744) (-0.779) 
D_COOP -0.033  0.106  0.069 -0.017 -0.035 -0.030 
 (-0.389) (0.594) (0.399) (-0.064) (-0.074) (-0.065) 
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =        
 0.006 
(0.171) 
0.030 
(2.293) 
0.022 
(1.493) 
-0.090  
(3.843)* 
-0.092 
(3.381)* 
-0.093 
(3.484)* 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
-0.122 
(45.693)*** 
-0.121 
(28.259)*** 
 0.066 
(1.502)  
-0.029 
(0.1643) 
0.021 
(0.078) 
-0.128 
(0.620) 
J-stat 156.694 121.687 128.108 42.009 37.046 41.120 
Observations 2379 1847 1826 2339 1821 1801 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year 
rolling Z-score; D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; ∆CAP= annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; SD_ROAt-1 = previous year 
SD_ROA; ; LOG_Zt-1 = previous year LOG_Z; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; 
GDP= growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and 
savings banks. 
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Table A6a. Decrease in capital (∆CAP<0) and risk-taking behavior (1992-2006) 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL 
       
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP 4( )α   0.507  0.703  0.583  0.221  0.228  0.217 
 (1.325) (1.881)* (1.583) (1.877)* (2.033)** (1.906)* 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
 0.473  0.398  0.445  0.110  0.106  0.086 
 (0.839) (0.682) (0.770) (0.508) (0.470) (0.380) 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
 0.998    0.508   
 (0.959)   (1.085)   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER   0,992    0.699  
6
( )α  
 (0.685)   (1.323)  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG    3.989    0.279 
6
( )α  
  (2.021)**   (0.372) 
RWAt-1 -0.152 -0.119 -0.125    
 (-2.432)** (-1.879)* (-1.986)**    
NPLt-1    -0.343 -0.368 -0.366 
    (-9.529)*** 
(-
10.425)*** 
(-
10.340)*** 
D_AD  -2.304 -2.633 -2.459  0.004 -0.163 -0.096 
 (-2.624)*** (-2.893)*** (-2.741)*** (0.0146) (-0.538) (-0.317) 
D_UNDER  -9.563    0.247   
 (-4.350)***   (0.387)   
D_UNDERMODER   -9.015   -0.045  
  (-3.706)***   (-0.054)  
D_UNDERSTRONG    -21.596    0.707 
   (-3.121)***   (0.596) 
EFF -0.055 -0.038 -0.047  0.067  0.054  0.063 
 (-1.332) (-0.908) (-1.127) (3.213)*** (2.599)*** (3.053)*** 
SIZE  0.171  0.420  0.591  0.679  0.613  0.637 
 (0.229) (0.554) (0.785) (2.183)** (1.855)* (1.914)* 
GDP  0.181  0.206  0.196 -0.092 -0.092 -0.090 
 (1.132) (1.201) (1.149) (-1.364) (-1.257) (-1.202) 
D_SAV  2.821  3.248  3.155  0.261   
 (0.696) (0.784) (0.766) (0.202)   
D_COOP -3.301  0.932  0.828 -0.540   
 (-0.695) (0.147) (0.131) (-0.458)   
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =     
 0.980  
(3.480)* 
1.102 
(4.068)** 
1.028 
(3.570)* 
0.331  
(2.776)* 
0.335 
(2.491) 
0.303 
(2.052) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
1.506 
(2.124) 
1.696 
(1.398) 
4.573  
( 5.361)** 
0.729 
(2.488) 
 0.927 
(3.154)* 
 0.497 
(0.442) 
J-stat 60.509 46.294 47.315 172.989 173.741 170.822 
Observations 2644 2489 2479 2126 1863 1855 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent the t 
statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual changes in the ratio 
of non-performing loans to net loans;  D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆CAP 
= annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; RWAt-1 = Previous year ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; 
D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table A6b. Decrease in capital (∆CAP<0) and risk-taking behavior (1992-2006) 
 SD_ROA LOG_Z 
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP
4
( )α  
 0.129  0.277  0.266 -0.207 -0.246 -0.233 
 (7.313)*** (8.424)*** (8.392)*** (-4.572)*** (-3.969)*** (-3.876)*** 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
-0.142 -0.269 -0.264  0.210  0.329  0.326 
 (-5.589)*** (-6.647)*** (-6.575)*** (3.450)*** (4.237)*** (4.234)*** 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-0.074   -0.174   
 (-1.124)   (-1.077)   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -0.146   -0.030  
6
( )α  
 (-1.525)   (-0.172)  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -0.246   -0.301 
6
( )α  
  (-2.297)**   (-1.339) 
SD_ROAt-1  0.422  0.410 -0.613    
 (13.649)*** (7.181)*** (-10.697)***    
LOG_Zt-1     0.536  0.538  0.543 
    (8.526)*** (9.116)*** (9.357)*** 
D_AD  -0.095 -0.241 -0.232  0.111  0.273  0.273 
 (-2.785)*** (-4.909)*** (-4.730)*** (1.391) (2.939)*** (2.947)*** 
D_UNDER  -0.008   -0.453   
 (-0.081)   (-1.867)*   
D_UNDERMODER   -0.108   -0.277  
  (-0.761)   (-1.056)  
D_UNDERSTRONG     0.000   -0.620 
   (0.000)   (-1.569) 
EFF  0.016  0.023  0.025 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 
 (6.354)*** (7.427)*** (7.959)*** (-2.562)** (-2.659)*** (-2.662)*** 
SIZE  0.185  0.357  0.340 -0.452 -0.561 -0.557 
 (5.065)*** (6.353)*** (6.220)*** (-5.428)*** (-5.390)*** (-5.470)*** 
GDP -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.030 -0.034 -0.035 
 (-0.504) (-0.418) (-0.566) (-1.479) (-1.491) (-1.504) 
D_SAV -0.174  0.057  0.058  0.098 -0.074 -0.071 
 (-1.119) (0.230) (0.236) (0.281) (-0.162) (-0.154) 
D_COOP  0.068  0.169  0.185 -0.483 -0.257 -0.252 
 (0.550) (0.672) (0.739) (-1.669)* (-0.548) (-0.540) 
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =        
-0.013   
(0.356) 
0.007 
(0.064) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.083 
(2.066) 
0.092 
(2.550) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
0.054 
(0.702) 
 0.130 
(1.956) 
0.020  
(0.037) 
-0.382 
(5.727)** 
-0.276  
(2.528) 
-0.534  
(5.817)** 
J-stat 555.666 377.847 386.152 63.088 43.606 42.922 
Observations 2496 2078 2068 2459 2046 2034 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year 
rolling Z-score; ; D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_AD=1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; ∆CAP = annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; SD_ROAt-1 = previous year 
SD_ROA;  LOG_Zt-1 = previous year LOG_Z; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; 
GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and 
savings banks. 
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Table A7a. Impact of changes in capital on risk changes for European banks with a relatively 
low ratio of deposits to total assets (1992-2006) 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL 
       
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP 4( )α   0.507  0.534  0.082  0.457  0.355  0.352 
 (1.645)* (1.763)* (0.293) (4.309)*** (3.887)*** (3.884)*** 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
 0.498  0.509  0.901 -0.316 -0.198 -0.231 
 (1.218) (1.248) (2.307)** (-2.031)** (-1.363) (-1.615) 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-2.120   -0.706   
 (-4.012)***   (-3.492)***   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -2.853   -0.636  
6
( )α  
 (-4.957)***   (-3.188)***  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG    2.441   -0.041 
6
( )α  
  (1.216)   (-0.089) 
RWAt-1 -0.244 -0.207 -0.291    
 (-3.675)*** (-2.993)*** (-4.478)***    
NPLt-1    -0.262 -0.322 -0.322 
    (-7.191)*** (-8.552)*** (-8.933)*** 
D_AD  -1.132 -1.392 -0.661  0.0799  0.154  0.139 
 (-1.652)* (-2.027)** (-1.035) (0.408) (0.785) (0.724) 
D_UNDER  -2.161    0.184   
 (-1.436)   (0.413)   
D_UNDERMODER   -1.886    0.158  
  (-1.181)   (0.300)  
D_UNDERSTRONG    -11.134   -1.276 
   (-2.344)**   (-1.391) 
EFF -0.024 -0.035 -0.026  0.072  0.081  0.066 
 (-0.570) (-0.829) (-0.618) (3.740)*** (4.389)*** (3.725)*** 
SIZE -2.352 -2.464 -3.254  0.621  0.470  0.570 
 (-2.394)** (-2.500)** (-3.379)*** (1.935)* (1.468) (1.790)* 
GDP  0.261  0.303  0.120 -0.234 -0.112 -0.107 
 (1.348) (1.547) (0.631) (-3.410)*** (-1.616) (-1.547) 
D_SAV     0.1857   
    (0.136)   
D_COOP     0.132   
    (0.152)   
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =     
1.005 
(9.792)*** 
1.044 
(10.271)*** 
0.983 
(9.778)*** 
0.140 
(1.545) 
0.157 
(1.800) 
0.120 
(1.101) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
-1.613 
(13.875)*** 
-2.318 
(10.271)*** 
2.524 
(1.589) 
-0.249 
(2.197) 
-0.280 
(2.532) 
0.310 
(0.464) 
J-stat 62.122 61.789 76.842 145.285 108.215 134.766 
Observations 2395 2353 2318 2075 1804 1776 
 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent the t 
statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual changes in the ratio 
of non-performing loans to net loans;  D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆CAP 
= annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; RWAt-1 = Previous year ratio of risk weighted assets to total 
assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; 
D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table A7b. Impact of changes in capital on risk changes for European banks with a relatively 
low ratio of deposits to total assets (1992-2006) 
 SD_ROA LOG_Z 
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP
4
( )α  
 0.111  0.079  0.078 -0.047 -0.131 -0.139 
 (5.146)*** (3.929)*** (3.916)*** (-1.100) (-2.418)** (-2.587)*** 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
-0.128 -0.089 -0.089  0.017  0.120  0.131 
 (-4.802)*** (-3.497)*** (-3.510)*** (0.315) (1.777)* (1.943)* 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-0.247    0.034   
 (-7.791)***   (0.447)   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -0.171    0.119  
6
( )α  
 (-5.406)***   (1.331)  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -0.079   -0.023 
6
( )α  
  (-1.440)   (-0.133) 
SD_ROAt-1  0.597  0.355  0.346    
 (14.282)*** (9.484)*** (8.970)***    
LOG_Zt-1     0.711  0.634  0.623 
    (13.422)*** (10.718)*** (10.626)*** 
D_AD  -0.029 -0.033 -0.025 -0.070 -0.004 -0.011 
 (-1.061) (-1.335) (-1.001) (-1.186) (-0.075) (-0.186) 
D_UNDER  -0.028   -0.013   
 (-0.400)   (-0.082)   
D_UNDERMODER   -0.031    0.097  
  (-0.432)   (0.513)  
D_UNDERSTRONG     0.143   -0.138 
   (1.220)   (-0.384) 
EFF  0.018  0.012  0.012 -0.008 -0.011 -0.012 
 (6.507)*** (4.621)*** (4.344)*** (-1.320) (-1.838)* (-1.935)* 
SIZE  0.268  0.127  0.121 -0.309 -0.441 -0.460 
 (5.035)*** (2.580)*** (2.479)** (-2.921)*** (-3.532)*** (-3.6796*** 
GDP  0.009 -0.0009 -0.003 -0.017 -0.031 -0.032 
 (0.951) (-0.092) (-0.337) (-0.785) (-1.234) (-1.249) 
D_SAV -0.352  0.067  0.074  0.295 -0.136 -0.140 
 (-1.464) (0.272) (0.297) (0.570) (-0.215) (-0.220) 
D_COOP  0.127  0.179  0.182 -0.084 -0.244 -0.244 
 (1.174) (1.154) (1.148) (-0.348) (-0.608) (-0.606) 
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =        
-0.017 
(1.266) 
-0.009 
(0.379) 
-0.010 
(0.463) 
-0.029 
(0.809) 
-0.010 
(0.081) 
-0.008 
(0.048) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
-0.135 
(32.572)*** 
-0.091 
(15.009)*** 
-0.0008 
(0.0002) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
-0.012 
(0.024) 
-0.163 
(0.979) 
J-stat 421.756 342.768 326.390 34.542 37.043 33.219 
Observations 2727 2261 2244 2680 2227 2208 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual 
changes in the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans; D_UNDER = 1 when bank-risk based capital 
ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and 
tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% 
and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_AD=1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  
and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets; 
LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year rolling Z-score; ∆CAP = annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; 
SD_ROAt-1 = previous year SD_ROA; LOG_Zt-1 = previous year LOG_Z; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = 
logarithm of total asset; GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for 
mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table A8a. Impact of changes in capital on risk changes for European banks with a relatively 
high ratio of deposits to total assets (1992-2006) 
 ∆RWA ∆NPL 
       
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP 4( )α   1.498  1.927  1.912  0.286  0.009  0.013 
 (2.731)*** (3.276)*** (3.238)*** (1.398) (0.047) (0.067) 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
 0.034 -0.559 -0.489 -0.015  0.141  0.099 
 (0.041) (-0.612) (-0.526) (-0.046) (0.363) (0.248) 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-3.028    0.431   
 (-1.959)*   (1.093)   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -0.844    0.947  
6
( )α  
 (-0.426)   (2.066)**  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -1.683   -0.209 
6
( )α  
  (-0.438)   (-0.266) 
RWAt-1 -0.104 -0.118 -0.125    
 (-1.705)* (-1.703)* (-1.799)*    
NPLt-1    -0.234 -0.333 -0.300 
    (-4.668)*** (-6.432)*** (-5.825)*** 
D_AD  -7.848 -7.592 -7.664 -0.428 -0.372 -0.180 
 (-6.954)*** (-6.276)*** (-6.230)*** (-1.089) (-0.834) (-0.395) 
D_UNDER  -10.973    0.238   
 (-3.684)***   (0.322)   
D_UNDERMODER   -8.434   -0.880  
  (-2.586)***   (-0.854)  
D_UNDERSTRONG    -28.075    1.727 
   (-2.437)**   (1.389) 
EFF -0.036 -0.058 -0.069  0.095  0.107  0.117 
 (-0.730) (-1.048) (-1.234) (3.078)*** (3.279)*** (3.447)*** 
SIZE -0.440  0.135 -0.155  0.333  0.043  0.056 
 (-0.448) (0.130) (-0.147) (0.691) (0.080) (0.104) 
GDP -0.055  0.015 -0.004 -0.124 -0.024  0.002 
 (-0.293) (0.074) (-0.024) (-1.303) (-0.223) (0.024) 
D_SAV     0.491   
    (0.143)   
D_COOP    -0.516   
    (-0.201)   
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =     
1.533 
(4.896)** 
1.368 
(3.261)* 
1.422 
(3.351)* 
0.270 
(0.957) 
0.151 
(0.199) 
0.113 
(0.104) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
-1.529 
(1.167) 
1.083 
(0.322) 
0.228 
(0.003) 
0.717 
(4.117)** 
0.957 
(5.110)** 
-0.196 
(0.065) 
J-stat 46.795 39.201 37.440 160.277 173.699 169.956 
Observations 2319 2046 2034 1580 1324 1307 
 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent the t 
statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; ∆NPL = annual changes in the ratio 
of non-performing loans to net loans;  D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆CAP 
= annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; RWAt-1 = Previous year ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; 
D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and savings banks. 
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Table A8b. Impact of changes in capital on risk changes for European banks with a relatively 
high ratio of deposits to total assets (1992-2006) 
 SD_ROA LOG_Z 
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) 
∆CAP
4
( )α  
 0.102  0.337  0.314 -0.198 -0.252 -0.249 
 (6.519)*** (8.143)*** (8.125)*** (-5.027)*** (-3.629)*** (-3.720)*** 
∆CAP*D_AD 
5
( )α  
-0.088 -0.310 -0.288  0.129  0.154  0.155 
 (-3.350)*** (-5.587)*** (-5.444)*** (1.903)* (1.647)* (1.667)* 
∆CAP*D_UNDER 
6
( )α  
-0.092    0.115   
 (-2.400)**   (1.195)   
∆CAP*D_UNDERMODER  -0.351    0.185  
6
( )α  
 (-4.635)***   (1.510)  
∆CAP*DUM_UNDERSTRONG   -0.219    0.058 
6
( )α  
  (-1.916)*   (0.294) 
SD_ROAt-1  0.398  0.342  0.318    
 (14.026)*** (6.249)*** (5.966)***    
LOG_Zt-1     0.454  0.453  0.439 
    (8.546)*** (7.463)*** (7.469)*** 
D_AD  -0.037 -0.074 -0.083  0.081  0.104  0.114 
 (-1.214) (-1.298) (-1.522) (1.017) (1.076) (1.170) 
D_UNDER   0.090   -0.096   
 (1.234)   (-0.509)   
D_UNDERMODER    0.148   -0.053  
  (1.010)   (-0.215)  
D_UNDERSTRONG     0.018   -0.323 
   (0.101)   (-1.008) 
EFF  0.007  0.017  0.015 -0.001 -0.013 -0.011 
 (3.399)*** (5.188)*** (4.783)*** (-0.335) (-2.120)** (-1.815)* 
SIZE  0.132  0.263  0.227 -0.325 -0.438 -0.442 
 (3.757)*** (3.838)*** (3.477)*** (-3.641)*** (-3.831)*** (-3.875)*** 
GDP  0.009  0.014  0.013  0.003 -0.012 -0.013 
 (1.027) (0.895) (0.892) (0.156) (-0.458) (-0.497) 
D_SAV -0.076   -0.188   
 (-0.419)   (-0.406)   
D_COOP  0.021   -0.784   
 (0.102)   (-1.4638)   
  F-test:                    
4 5
0α α+ =        
0.013 
(0.400) 
0.026 
(0.503) 
0.025 
(0.497) 
-0.069 
(1.562) 
-0.097 
(2.360) 
-0.093 
(2.080) 
                                
4 6
0α α+ =  
0.010 
(0.087) 
-0.014 
(0.054) 
0.094 
(0.732) 
-0.083 
(0.873) 
-0.066 
(0.426) 
-0.190 
(0.982) 
J-stat 480.062 137.606 157.515 61.400 47.105 51.011 
Observations 2165 1669 1649 2137 1645 1626 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. ; SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets; LOG_Z = logarithm of 3-year 
rolling Z-score; D_UNDER = 1 when bank-risk based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise; D_AD=1 when bank risk-based capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 
otherwise; ∆CAP = annual changes in the ratio of total capital to total assets; SD_ROAt-1 = previous year 
SD_ROA; LOG_Zt-1 = previous year LOG_Z; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total asset; GDP 
= growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; D_COOP and D_SAV = dummies for mutual & cooperative and 
savings banks. 
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Table A9a. Simultaneous equations (1992-2006) 
 ∆RWA ∆CAP 
∆CAP (α3) 3.225  
 (2.365)**  
∆CAP*D_AD (α4) -2.215  
 (-3.77)  
∆CAP*D_UNDER (α5) -6.748  
 (-3.142)***  
∆RWA (α3)  0.071 
  (2.593)*** 
∆RWA*D_AD (α4)   -0.055 
  (-1.864)* 
∆RWA*D_UNDER (α5)  -0.096 
  (-2.71)*** 
RWAt-1 -0.051  
 (-2.839)***  
CAPt-1  -0.062 
  (-8.293)*** 
D_AD  -2.962 0.460 
 (-3.77)*** (4.388)*** 
D_UNDER  -3.227 0.735 
 (-1.438) (2.384)** 
ROA  1.053 
  (5.189)*** 
EFF 0.164 0.062 
 (2.532)** (2.765)*** 
SIZE 0.442 0.129 
 (3.752)*** (2.400)** 
GDP -0.218 0.118 
 (-1.907)* (4.338)*** 
Khi2 test :                
3 4
0α α+ =  
1.009 
(3.877)** 
0.016 
(2.338) 
                             
3 5
0α α+ =  
-3.523 
(6.049)** 
-0.024 
(1.092) 
R2 -0.019 -0.382 
Observations 3130 3130 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. ∆RWA = annual changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets;  D_UNDER = 1 when 
bank risk-based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-
based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank 
risk-based capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based 
capital ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆CAP = annual changes in the ratio of total 
capital to total assets; RWAt-1 = Previous year ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; CAPt-1 = Previous year 
ratio of total capital to total assets; ROA= return on average assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm 
of total assets; GDP = growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. 
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Table A9b. Simultaneous equations (1992-2006) 
 SD_ROA ∆CAP 
∆CAP (α3) 0.667  
 (5.439)***  
∆CAP*D_AD (α4) -0.684  
 (-5.994)***  
∆CAP*D_UNDER (α5) -0.604  
 (-3.458)***  
SD_ROA (α3)  0.073 
  (0.946) 
SD_ROA*D_AD (α4)   -0.536 
  (-2.133)** 
SD_ROA*D_UNDER (α5)  0.368 
  (0.828) 
SD_ROAt-1 0.468  
 (4.895)***  
CAPt-1  -0.049 
  (-5.854)*** 
D_AD  -0.006 0.507 
 (-0.129) (6.093)*** 
D_UNDER  -0.041 0.390 
 (-0.298) (1.966)** 
ROA  0.504 
  (7.484)*** 
EFF -0.001 0.017 
 (-0.185) (1.218) 
SIZE -0.039 0.026 
 (-3.176)*** (0.835) 
GDP -0.022 0.060 
 (-1.481) (2.765) 
Khi2 test :             
3 4
0α α+ =  
-0.016 
(0.121) 
-0.463 
(3.957)** 
                             
3 5
0α α+ =  
0.063 
(0.231) 
0.442 
(1.065) 
R2 -1.209 0.133 
Observations 2869 3586 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; figures in brackets represent 
the t statistics. SD_ROA = 3-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets;  D_UNDER = 1 when bank risk -
based capital ratio<8% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERMODER = 1 when bank risk-based capital 
ratio<8% and tier1 ratio ≥4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_UNDERSTRONG = 1 when bank risk-based 
capital ratio<8% and tier1 ratio<4 in the previous year, 0 otherwise; D_AD = 1 when bank risk-based capital 
ratio between 8%  and 10% in the previous year, 0 otherwise; ∆CAP= annual changes in the ratio of total capital 
to total assets; SD_ROAt-1 = previous year standard deviation of return on assets;  CAPt-1 = Previous year ratio  of 
total capital to total assets; ROA= return on average assets; EFF = cost to income ratio; SIZE = logarithm of total 
assets; GDP= growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. 
 
 
